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Abstract 
The number of babies requiring neonatal intensive care exceeds the facilities available. The 
assignment questions the perceived shortage of resources and investigates methods of resource 
allocation. 
The first chapter addresses the development ot technology and reflects briefly on the romance 
between medicine and technology. The second chapter addresses the issue ot prognosis ot the 
small preterm neonate and reflects on how these data are derived and the assumptions that are 
often made based on prognostic data. Chapter three concentrates on how outcomes discussed 
in the second chapter may be quantified. Individual utility quantification plays a role in decision 
making for the individual neonate, while comparative utility quantification addresses some ot the 
issues concerned with the macroallocation of resources. 
This leads into chapter four that addresses macroallocation and challenges some of the 
assumptions that resource allocation is based upon. Are resources scarce? Are there financial 
constraints? What is the role of medicine in health? Will redistribution of wealth necessarily 
improve the health of the population? 
Who should. make decisions for individual sick neonates regarding neonatal intensive care is 
addressed in the next chapter. The tension between sanctity-ot-life and quality-of-life ideologies, 
created by life sustaining technology has been legally and ethically settled in favour of the 
patient's right to self-determination, based on the principle ot respect for patient autonomy. It will 
however be argued that the traditional four principles cannot be utilised as the neonate is at best 
pre-autonomous. Moral obligations towards the neonate are dependent on the beneficence and 
non-maleficence obligations of the parents and the caregivers. Both these principles are prima 
facie and may have to be tempered by distributive justice. 
Plato's absolutist thinking and Descartes mathematician's perspective, have influenced medicine's 
romance with certainty. If knowledge and certainty are necessary for decision· making and it is 
shown that absolute certainty is elusive, should we be nihilistic about decision making in neonatal 
intensive care? Chapter 6 critically assesses three approaches to decision making in the 
presence of prognostiC uncertainty. 
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In contemporary medicine there is a constant tension between the traditional commitment to the 
patient on the one hand and the awareness"that resources are finite on the other, this tension is an 
unfortunate reality of medicine. To constrain the growth of medical expenditure, doctors are now 
asked to serve simultaneously as society's agent of cost containment and as the patient's agent 
for maximum health. There is increasing pressure on doctors to serve two masters, society and 
the patient. Acting on behalf Of society as a gatekeeper, while for the patient the doctor is 
expected to act as advocate. Chapter seven investigates both gate-keeping and advocacy and 
attempts to answer the question whether doctors can and indeed should try to serve two masters 
Simultaneously? 
The final chapter brings together the threads of the various extended arguments and attempts to 
give solutions to some of the conundrums. 
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ABSTRAK 
Die hoeveelheid babas wat neonatale intensiewe sorg benodig oorskry die beskikbare fasiliteite. 
Die taak bevraagteken die waameming van 'n tekort aan hulpbronne en ondersoek dus metodes 
van hulpbronallokasie. 
Die eerste hoofstuk bespreek die ontwikkeling van tegnologie en reflekteer kortliks oor die 
romanse tussen medisyne en tegnologie. Die tweede hoofstuk handel oor die uitslag van die 
prognose van die klein voortydse neonaat en reflekteer hoe die data afgelei word en die 
veronderstellings wat dikwels gemaak word, gebaseer op prognostiese data. Hoofstuk drie 
konsentreer op die bespreekte uitkomste van hoofstuk twee en hoe dit bepaal kan word. Nuttige 
individuele bepaling speel In rol tydens besluitneming ten opsigte van die individuele neonaat, 
andersyds, vergelykende nuttige bepaling spreek sommige van die punte ten opsigte van die 
makro-allokasie van hulpbronne aan. 
Laasgenoemde gee inleiding tot hoofstuk vier, wat makro-allokasie aanspreek en sommige van 
die aannames waarop hulpbronallokasie gebaseer is uitdaag. Is hulpbronne skaars? Is daar 
finansi~le beperking? Wat is die rol van medisyne in gesondheid? Sal herverspreiding van 
rykdom noodwendig die gesondheid van die populasie verbeter? 
Wie verantwoordelik is vir besluitneming ten opsigte van die siek neonaat in intensiewe sorg word 
in die volgende hoofstuk bespreek. Die spanning tussen onskendbaarheid-van-Iewe en kwaliteit-
van-Iewe ideologi~', moontlik gemaak met behulp van lewens-onderhoudende tegnologie is wettig 
sowel as eties vasgestel ten gunste van die pasi~nt se reg tot selfbeskikking, gebaseer op die 
beginsel van respek vir die pasi~nt se selfbeskikking. Dit sal egter betwis word dat die 
tradisionele vier beginsels nie aangevoer kan word nie omdat die neonaat pre-outonomies is. 
Morele verpligtinge teenoor die neonaat is afhanklik van die weldadigheid en onskadelike 
verpligtinge van die ouers en versorgers. Seide hierdie beginsels is prima facie en sal moontlik 
deur verdelende reg getemper moet word. 
Plato se absolutistiese denke en Descartes se wiskundige perspektief het die medisyne se 
romantiek met sekerheid be·invloed. Indien kennis en sekerheid nodig is vir besluitneming en dit 
is bewys dat absolute sekerheid misleidend is, moet ons nihilisties wees oor besluitneming in 
neonatale intensiewe sorg? In Hoofstuk 6 word die drie benaderings tot besluitneming in die 
teenwoordigheid van prognostiese onsekerheid krities beraam. 
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In die hedendaagse medisyne is daar 'n konstante spanning tussen die tradisionele verpligting 
teenoor die pasient aan die een kant en die bewustheid dat hulpbronne beperk is aan die ander 
kant - hierdie spanning is 'n tragiese werklikheid in die medisyne. Om sodoende die mediese 
uitgawe te beperk, word medici versoek om gelyktydig te dien as die gemeenskap se agent om 
koste te beperk asook die pasient se agent vir maksimum gesondheid. Daaris toenemende 
. druk op Medici om twee meesters te dien - die gemeenskap en die pasient. Om op te tree as 
hekwagter namens die gemeenskap, terwyl daar van die dolder verwag word om namens die 
pasient as sy advokaat op te tree. Hoofstuk sewe ondersoek, b~ide die hekwagter en advokaat 
en daar word gepoog om die vraag te beantwoord of dolders kan en inderdaad durf poog om 
twee meesters gelyktydig te dien? 
Die finale hoofstuk dien as samebindende faldor van die verskeie uitgebreide argumente en 
pogings om oplossings te bied tot sommige van die vraagstukke. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Contents 
Chapter 
1. Adumbration 1 
2. A brief history of technology 4 
3. Prognostic prediction 13 
4. Individual and comparative utility 25 
5. Macroeconomics 37 
6. Consent, who should decide? 48 
7. Uncertainty and how decissions should be made 60 
8. Advocate and gatekeeper or advocate or gatekeeper? 70 
9. Synthesis 77 
Appendix A: Prognostic tables 79 
Appendix B: Combined bibliography 81 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 1 
Adumbration 
1 
The Priorities in Perinatal Care Conference is a conference that has been held annually since 
1981. Delegates at the Conference are predominantly state employed health care workers, 
mainly doctors and nurses, interested in the perinatal period. They are dedicated to improving 
pregnancy and neonatal care to indigent patients dependent on public health facilities. Most, but 
not all the delegates while working for the state are employed at a~demic hospitals. 
The majority of state funded neonatal intensive care beds in the country are situated in academic 
hospitals. In their normal line of duty conference delegates are regularly confronted by neonates 
requiring neonatal intensive care within the public health system. In March 1991 delegates of the 
10th Priorities in Perinatal Care Conference adopted a consensus statement restricting neonatal 
intensive care facilities to 'those neonates weighing 1000g or more 1• The allocation of resources 
has always been of interest to the author. Since becoming aware of the consenSus statement, 
the author has always wished to have the opportunity to reflect on the allocation of neonatal 
intensive care facilities and critically evaluate the consensus statement. 
There are essentially two co-~xisting neonatal intensive care allocation processes. Resource 
allocation at the global level of decision-making, called macroallocation, is usually distinguished 
from microallocation or rationing decisions about which individuals receive what services. 
Macroallocation decisions determine how much money is allocated to health care in the country. 
Macroallocation decisions determine how much of a given resource ultimately is made available 
to ration among individual patients. Rationing occurs at the level of the patient, where it is 
decided whether or not a patient should receive a treatment that is in limited supply. The 
different allocation processes each have their own decision-making process. As the consensus 
statement embraces both macro- and microallocation the dissertation will examine resource 
allocation and appropriate decision making at both levels. 
The first three chapters are largely introductory in nature. The first chapter addresses the 
development of technology and reflects briefly on the romance between medicine and 
technology. This leads into the second chapter, the introduction of which outlines the 
development of neonatal intensive care. 
Despite drastically different foundations both deontologists and utilitarians would argue that 
knowledge of outcome must be available for clinical care. The second chapter addresses the 
issue of prognosis of the small preterm neonate and reflects on how these data are derived and 
the assumptions that are often made based on prognostic data. Chapter three concentrates on 
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how outcomes discussed in the second chapter may be quantified. Individual utility quantification 
plays a role in decision making for the individual neonate, while comparative utility quantification 
addresses some of the issues.concemed with the macroallocation of resources. Chapters two 
and three leave one with a feeling of prognostic uncertainty, uncertainty whether it is indeed 
possible to prognosticate for the individual patient and uncertainty as to how to quantify 
outcomes. 
Chapter three concludes with a discussion on comparative utility, discussing ways of quantifying 
outcome for groups of patients. This in tum can then be used as one way of deciding which 
therapy should be given. This leads into chapter four that addresses macroallocation and 
challenges some of the assumptions that resource allocation is based upon. Are resources 
sGarce? Are there financial constraints? What is the role of medicine in health? Will 
redistribution of wealth necessarily improve the health of the population? 
Who should make decisions for individual sick neonates regarding neonatal intensive care is 
addressed in the next chapter. The tension between sanctity-of-life and quality-of-life ideologies, 
created by life sustaining technology has been legally and ethically settled in favour of the 
patient's right to self-determination, based on the principle of respect for patient autonomy. 
Although there are numerous ethical approaches, principlism has been utilised in the dissertation, 
due to its widespread use in medical ethics and easy understanding by the medical profession. It 
will however be argued that the traditional four principles cannot be utilised, as the neonate is at 
best pre-autonomous. Moral obligations towards the neonate are dependent on the beneficence 
and non-maleficence obligations of the parents and the caregivers. Both these principles are 
prima facie and may have to be tempered by distributive justice. 
Plato's absolutist thinking and Descartes' mathematician's perspective, have influenced 
medicine's romance with certainty. Conventional medical education fosters doctors with the notion 
that uncertainty is a manifestation of ignorance, weakness or failure. If knowledge and certainty 
are necessary for decision making and it is shown that absolute certainty is elusive, should we be 
nihilistic about decision making in neonatal intensive care? Chapter 6 critically assesses three 
approaches to decision making in the presence of prognostic uncertainty. 
The consensus statement restricts admission to neonatal intensive care to neonates weighing 
more than 1000g and as such has a gate-keeping function. In contemporary medicine there is a 
constant tension between the traditional commitment to the patient on the one hand and the 
awareness that resources are finite on the other. This tension is an unfortunate reality of 
medicine. To constrain the growth of medical expenditure, doctors are now asked to serve 
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simultaneously as the patient's agent for maximum health and as society's agent of cost 
containment and as the patient's agent for maximum health. There is increasing pressure on 
doctors to serve two masters, society and the patient. Acting on behalf of society as a gatekeeper, 
while for the patient the doctor is expected to act as advocate. Chapter seven investigates both 
gate-keeping and advocacy and attempts to answer the question whether doctors can and indeed 
should try to serve two masters simultaneously. 
The final chapter brings together the threads of the various extended arguments and tries to justify 
why the delegates at a Priorities in Perinatal Care Conference, individuals known for their 
dedication to the indigent patient, issued the consensus statement. 
Reference 
1. Wainer S, Khumalo H. Attitudes of mothers, doctors, and nurses toward neonatal intensive 
care in a developing society. Pediatrics 1993;91 :1171-1175. 
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Chapter 2 
A brief history of technology 
Technology has revolutionised medicine. Once life could only be established in the womb and 
when established could only be suppressed at the cost of drastic danger to the women. Death 
was indisputable and unpostponable. Technology has changed all this; life can now be created in 
a laboratory test-tube, the nature of life can be altered by gene therapy. Those facing death as a 
result of the failure of a vital organ can have their lives prolonged by organ transplantation. 
Those unable to eat can be fed intravenously, those unable to breathe can be ventilated and 
when death is inevitable, the process of dying can be indefinitely prolonged. Technology is 
perceived as helping man in the struggle against nature and in so doing blurring many 
conventional distinctions. 
Technology is a major cultural determinant, no less important in shaping human lives than 
philosophy, religion, social organisation, or political systems. In the broadest sense, these forces 
are also aspects of technology. The French sociologist Jacques Ellul has defined /a technique as 
the totality of all rational methods in every field of human activity, so that, for example, education, 
law, sports, propaganda, and the social sciences are all technologies in that sense. At the other 
end of the scale, common parlance limits the term's meaning to technological innovation. 
The terms science and technology are often confounded. The confusion arises because so much 
of contemporary technology is based on the natural sciences--such disciplines as phYSics, 
chemistry, biology, and other branches of knowledge that deal with the study, measurement, and 
understanding of natural phenomena. The achievements of the medical, pharmaceutical, 
electronic and plastiCS industries are based on a huge body of scientific investigation. 
In simplest terms, the concern of science is "why," and of technology, "how." The relationship 
between the two is actually much more complex, however, and it varies from industry to industry: 
some technologies are science intensive, whereas the manufacture of such items as furniture 
depends much less on science. In fact, much of modern technology developed without any 
scientific input Whatever, and there are many examples of entire sciences arising from earlier 
technologies or developing in an effort to explain findings made by scientifically naive artisans. 
For instance, gunnery led to ballistiCS; the steam engine, to thermodynamics; powered flight, to 
aerodynamics; primitive metalworking, to metallurgy; and communications, to radio astronomy. 
The history of technology is the study of the changes through which economic, cultural, and 
military techniques have evolved and of the social, economic, and political consequences those 
changes have produced. To reach a full understanding of the history of technology, one cannot 
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consider instruments and techniques in isolation but must also consider many events, some of 
them seemingly remote, that have had a bearing on the evolution of technology: the role of the 
techno'logist and engineer and their status and training; geography and climate; division of 
labour; the processes of invention and innovation; the diffusion of knowledge; the technical 
consequences of research; the relationship between technology and science; traditions of art; 
and the development of crafts. 
According to Greek mythology the first technological innovation was fire. Legend has it that fire 
was brought to man by prometheus, who stole it from the God's for the benefit of man. 
Technology was introduced to man by a true humanitarian act. This is almost ironic as now 
technology often represents the antithesis of humanity. Prometheus was punished by the Gods 
for this - he was tied to a rock and every night a vulture devoured his liver. However such was 
the regenerative function of the liver that it regained it's function daily. Prometheus's torture 
continued for thirty years until he was rescued by Hercules. Fire has been turned to technological 
advantage in many ways. Cooking made foodstuffs more palatable, the clearing of forest lands 
made ground available for habitation and cultivation and the baking of pottery lead to functional 
crafts, to name but a few. 
The history of technology begins with the use of stone tools by the earliest humans--and perhaps 
even by their prehuman ancestors. The field of study may be divided into four major periods: the 
Palaeolithic (Old Stone Age), beginning about 2.5 million years ago; the Neolithic (New Stone 
Age) transition, dating from about 9000 BC; the Agricultural Civilisation, which originated with the 
invention of the plow in the 4th millennium BC; and Industrial Civilisation, which covers the past 
250 years. These divisions are approximate and sometimes extensively overlapping; even 
today, with agricultural and industrial civilisations existing side by side and each incorporating 
technology that is characteristic of the other, there also exist isolated groups of people who still 
employ Stone Age technology. Similarly, rudimentary forms of agriculture, or at least horticulture, 
may have been practised occasionally during the Palaeolithic, which was characterised by 
hunting and gathering. 
The Palaeolithic era and the Neolithic transition, which jOintly constitute more than 99% of the 
time span of technological history, lie properly in the domain of the prehistorian--mainly the 
archaeologist, anthropologist, and palaeontologist. Palaeolithic technology was the creation of 
both modern humans (Homo Sapiens) and at least one extinct species, Homo Erectus. Hunting 
of animals and gathering of eggs, insects, and edible plants were the dominant economic 
activities. On the evidence of surviving hunting-gathering societies, it may be supposed that a 
dual economy existed in which men hunted and women gathered. By the end of the Palaeolithic, 
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humanity's technological repertoire included the use of fire, stone tools, spears and spear 
throwers, the bow and arrow, simple oil lamps, pigments, mortars and pestles, and bone sewing 
needles. The Neolithic transition is characterised by the origins of food production through the 
development of plant and animal husbandry, wild cereal plants were domesticated, plant and 
animal husbandry was developed, and small farming communities were formed. Cultivation was 
accomplished with the use of the digging stick and the wood hoe. Neolithic crafts included 
pottery, spinning and weaving, basketmaking, and house building. 
The invention that mar1<ed the beginning of Agricultural Civilisation was the ox-drawn plow. Plow 
agriculture was accompanied by an array of momentous developments. Writing evolved; the 
political state came into being, possibly through the conflicting pressures of expanding population 
and limited fertile land in the river valleys, chronic warfare set in; and copper and bronze 
metallurgy was devised. Bronze and iron found their widest use in the paraphernalia of war. The 
substantial technical and cultural progress of these early civilisations, the emergence of crafts 
whose practitioners were relieved of the need to participate in food production, the increase in 
population, and the rise of many urban societies centred in impressively wealthy cities were 
entirely based on the productivity, and hence on the food surpluses, of plow agriculture. At first, 
surpluses adequate to sustain civilisation were possible only on irrigated land, so that the ear1iest 
civilisations were confined to alluvial river valleys. As the technology of plow agriculture improved, 
civilisation spread to rain-fed lands away from the river valleys. The introduction of the horseshoe 
and the horse collar permitted the substitution of the horse, with its greater speed and endurance, 
for the ox, completing the agricultural revolution that the heavy plow had initiated. 
The Middle Ages in Europe were in general prodigiously innovative. In the 8th century iron 
became widely available and once again was adapted to military needs. In the 12th century water 
mills, which had not been widely used until then, and windmills, the concept of which was only 
then reaching Europe from the East, brought a revolution in the production of power. On a small 
scale muscle power could be replaced by alternative sources. By the middle of the 16th century, 
English founders had perfected the casting of iron, instead of bronze, guns, thereby sharply 
reducing the cost of warfare. From the 15th through the 17th century, the period deSignated by 
cultural historians as the Renaissance, the new warfare employing guns and armed ships 
changed Europe from a provincial region to a centre of world power. 
During certain periods in history innovations in technology have grown at such a rapid pace that 
they have produced what have become known as industrial revolutions. The term Industrial 
Revolution Originally referred to the developments that transformed Britain, between 1750 and 
1630, from a largely rural population making a living almost entirely from agriculture to a town-
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centred population. The Industrial Revolution--based initially on water-power and later on steam 
engines and other energy converters--had the effect of replacing human and animal muscle as 
the principal source of power with machines. This change put much vaster resources at society's 
disposal and substantially raised living standards in all societies capable of taking advantage of 
technological innovations. Certainly, these triumphs also had their darker side, such as the 
misery that attended the initial displacements of industrialisation and the pollution and 
despoliation of the environment. It can be said that the Industrial Revolution gave rise to the 
engineering profession as it is recognised today. Where previously engineers had risen through 
the ranks of craftsmen, in the 18th century it was becoming apparent that the act of design should 
be codified in the form of technical training. Technical studies penetrated the established 
universities slowly, and it was in new institutions--such as the Ecole Polytechhique in Paris and 
the University of London--that engineering first took root in university education. 
A transformation of comparable significance began in the middle of the 20th century with the 
emergence of science-intensive industries, which were based on chemistry, modern physics, and 
especially mathematics. The electronic computer was the most prominent technological 
development of the time;. another was the amazing proliferation of artificial materials, many of 
which were developed for specific purposes. This transformation has been called the Second 
Industrial Revolution, in which many of the functions performed by the senses and the human 
mind have begun to be replaceq by machines, some of which greatly extend the range of 
possible achievements. It is sometimes also called the Scientific and Technical Revolution. As 
examples of this transformation, approaching aircraft are guided safely to a fogged-in airport by 
means of radar and radio, and the exact dimensions and quality of metal products are maintained 
during mass production by means of electronic sensors and controls. Previously computers 
made use of formal logic where only dichotomies were accepted. Artificial intelligence, used in 
newer computer systems involved in decision analysis, utilises fuzzy logic. The advantage of 
using fuzzy as opposed to formal logic in decisions about neonatal intensive care admission will 
be discussed in more detail elsewhere. 
Many innovators in medicine, like Prometheus, had to pay a heavy price for their innovations. In 
the fifteen hundreds Michael Servetuas a phYSician-theologian fell foul of the Church when he 
described the pulmonary circulation. At the same time William Harvey faced criticism and 
rejection for his description of the circulation of blood, yet eventually his book, De Motu Cordis 
(the abbreviated and familiar title!) became one of the most influential books in the history of 
medicine. 
The first instrument generally used in diagnosis was the stethoscope described by Lanennec in 
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1819. The invention was prompted by his contact with a young women whose symptoms 
suggested heart disease. He could not apply his ear directly to her chest because of her obesity 
and for moral reasons. Recalling that sound was amplified when transmitted through some solid 
structures, he rolled a sheath of paper into a cylinder, placed one end on her chest and listened 
at the other. The sounds were clear and the stethoscope was born. The first instrument 
developed in patient management was also the first step in separating the patient from the doctor. 
They were not only physically separated but now the distracted doctor was immersed in the 
mystique of sounds inaudible to the patient. 
One piece of equipment that had a modest unexpected beginning has developed into a highly 
effective, complicated and expensive machine. The imaging capabilities of modem radiology 
could hardly have been prophesied a century ago when Roentgen visualised the bones of his 
wife's hand. Imaging technology changed the one on one doctor-patient relationship. No longer 
did the doctor and patient have to be present simultaneously. With X-ray, a technician took the 
picture in the absence of the doctor and later a whole group of doctors could see the result and 
discuss the diagnosis without the physical presence of the patient. A multitude of medical 
developments have paralleled the technological explosion, however these two are paradigmatic 
of the growing chasm technology has brought to the doctor-patient relationship. Sceptics teach 
medical students that when all else fails examine the patient. 
In the first half of the century, the place of delivery shifted from home to hospital with the growing 
realisation that hospital deliveries could reduce the toll of complications for the mother. This 
move accelerated the medicalisation of a normal physiological process, birth. Until recently birth 
in hospital offered little survival advantage for the preterm infant as care of the neW-born infant 
was limited to the well-meaning gestures of the parents, midwives or doctors. Following the 
Second World War, many of the environmental causes of infant mortality (past the first month of 
life) could be reduced by improved sanitation, immunisation and antibiotics. Deaths in the 
neonatal period began to exceed infant mortality and the spotlight fell upon improving neonatal 
care. 
Antibiotics developed during the Second World War could be used to protect preterm infants from 
infection. Computer technology, the development of synthetic materials like plastiC and 
miniaturisation, necessitated by the Space Race, could be utilised to miniaturise medical 
technology designed to save adults' lives. Neonatal intensive care is a progeny of the 
technological age, successful equipment joined with miniaturisation and computer technology. 
Like the Sorcerer's broom in Walt Disney's film Fantasia technology has almost taken on a life of 
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it's own. 
Technology and philosophy 
In describing a model for culture, van Peursen in, The Strategy of Culture, describes three broad 
cultural traditions of thinking, the mythical, the ontological and the contemporary functional 
tradition. In the ontological phase man asked; what are phenomena? now in the functional phase 
the question is; how do things function? The functional approach well describes contemporary 
medical science. A scientist looking through a microscope symbolises this approach, the 
distance and the difference between the observer and the observed, the effort to intensely 
examine the smallest detail of the observed isolated from its context, and the use of reliable hard 
data. 
Functionalism runs the risk of deteriorating into operationalism where phenomena are defined in 
te.rms of how they function or operate. Medical perSonnel tend to see disease as some . 
malfunction of the individual and if they can isolate (diagnose) and eradicate (treat) the 
malfunction then the individual will be better. This reductionalist view can be observed when 
doctors, talking to each other, refer to patients in terms of the patient's malfunction rather than by 
the patients name. 'We admitted two breeches and one post-partum haemorrhage last night', is 
the type of statement often heard in a morning meeting discussing the previous nights admissions 
to a labour ward. Operationalism reduces everything to measurable functions or operations, 
leading to a loss of identity, where nobody is really anybody anymore. Overcoming this loss of 
identity is extremely difficult. 
In 1819 Laennec's stethoscope was the progenitor of medical technology and was specifically 
designed (for moral reasons!) to place a distance between the male doctor and the female 
patient's chest. A knowledge gap also developed as now the doctor could hear something (the 
patient's heart sounds), that the patient could not hear. The analogy of the microscope 
describing functionalism could also be used to illustrate the physical and emotional distance 
between doctor and neonate, the patient, in the neonatal intensive care unit. The extremely small 
premature infant can be described as humanoid at best, overwhelmed by an incubator with 
intravenous and arterial lines and tubes in virtually every natural orifice. The small neonate lies on 
the megacrib, developmentally and intellectually unable to communicate and due to the 
technology unable even to cry, hopefully unable to remember. Wiring and attachments monitor 
every monitorable bodily function, the data produced by the technology becomes a surrogate 
form of communication. The neonate communicates through urine output, pulse rate, blood 
pressure, oxygen saturation and blood culture results. The technocrats know 'eveything' about 
the baby down to the finest detail. Due to the fragile skin and the risk of infection, even 
UNIVERSITEIT STEllEN80SCH 
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unnecessary touching of the baby is discouraged. The neonatal intensive care, one of the 
pinnacles of medical technology, has widened the gap created by the stethoscope to a chasm. 
Neonatal intensive cares are usually high pressure busy units in hospitals. Goals are often short 
term, improving the arterial oxygenation or increasing the output may obsess the staff involved for 
the better part of a day. Although they are doubtless caring people, the staff will often slip into the 
operational mode and refer to a patient by the short term physiological goal that they are trying to 
attain. They will refer to the baby operationally, although they will claim pragmatically, by the 
malfunction. Alternatively babies are often referred to by either their or their mother's major 
pathology. 
Modem medicine was developed on certainties with well demarcated boundaries like 
motherhood, or as in the binary system used in computers, dichotomies like life and death with 
distinct boundaries. Modern medical technology has blurred many of these cherished 
distinctions. Technology in the form of reproductive technology has long challenged some of the 
traditional concepts of motherhood. Life and death certainties are now challenged on a daily 
basis by intensive care technologies. Medicine, while creating some of the first cracks in 
modernity's certainties, is slow in even acknowledging postmodernity. Modernity has a tendency 
. to try to simplify extremely complex data. Although to be addressed in more detail elsewhere, the 
idea of simplifying the admission criteria to neonatal intensive care to an easily measurable 
birthweight reflects a typical modern approach. . Simplicity and certainty are forced onto 
complexity and uncertainty. 
An asymmetry has developed between the prolific growth and expansion of the technological 
explosion and the seedling state of ethical and societal considerations. Philosophy has had a 
long running romance with the is/ought distinction, how things are opposed to how they either 
should be or it is desirable for them to be, in essence a fact - value distinction. Two similar 
distinctions the could/should and the possible/probable often need to be addressed in the 
neonatal intensive care. 
Doctors may feel compelled to use equipment merely due to its presence or 'availability as a 
technological imperative. Something can be done, so there is an obligation to intervene. The 
mere presence of the technology is interpreted as a moral warrant neceSSitating its application. 
The technoculture approach of, 'you could do something therefore you should do something' is 
apocryphal. On reflection the decision to utilise this type of expensive technology, where the 
prognosis is guarded, just as any decision to forego technology, should be backed by rigorous 
ethical reasoning. Neonatal intensive care may have solved many physiological problems. 
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However, many philosophical questions remain unaddressed. 
It is often not the technology itself that inspires fear but the approach of the people that develop 
and use it. Fallible people lose sight of their own fallibility in their scramble to expand the frontiers 
of science or knowledge, to redesign or overcome nature and to outwit the ultimate foe, death. In 
the case of neonatal intensive care, some may perceive the race to be on to push back the 
boundaries of viability, to be able to pull through the smallest of babies, irrespective of the 
consequences. The psychology of some of these technocrats may lead to confusion between 
means and ends. The small patient in the neonatal intensive care unit should never be used as a 
means towards ultimately developing the doctor's ego or reputation. Alternatively the intensive 
care therapy should never be an end unto itself. The medical effort and the technology utilised in 
the neonatal intensive care unit should be a means to be used only when the patient, the ends, 
may conceivably benefit from the therapy. 
When considering technology, particular1y in neonatal intensive care, the expression, 'every cloud 
has a silver lining', should perhaps be modified to 'every silver lining has a cloud'. The silver 
lining being the intensive care and its perceived advantages. The cloud being the problems with 
distributive justice as a result of the expenses; where intensive care has merely prolonged dying 
and not saved life and where lives saved may conceivably not be worth living. These essentially 
ethical issues will be addressed in greater detail later in the dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
Prognostic prediction 
The major killer of preterm infants is pulmonary complications. The immature lungs do not 
produce enough surfactant, a· chemical substance that stabilises the small alveoli during 
expiration. This means that at the end of expiration the neonate has to use an inordinate amount 
of energy to re-expand the lungs. Due to extreme prematurity these babies seldom have 
adequate energy supplies and they have small muscle volumes. The effort required at the 
beginning of each inspiration soon exhausts the babies. Once exhausted they can no longer 
expand the alveoli, leading to alveolar collapse, which in turn diminishes oxygen upta~e. The 
condition of the babies steadily declines until they die. Other problems encountered by the 
extremely preterm infant include intracranial haemorrhage from the delicate vascular system of 
their developing brains, temperature and fluid homeostasis. 
The outcome of preterm infants is preceded by a brief resume of the history of neonatal intensive 
care 1. The resume is important for a few reasons. Firstly the poor outcome of vulnerable 
neonates prior to the introduction of neonatal intensive care corresponds to the poor outcome of 
contemporary vulnerable preterm neonates denied admission to intensive care facilities. 
Secondly it shows the temporal nature of any research describing the outcome of neonates 
admitted to neonatal intensive care. New innovations and procedures improve outcome of the 
most vulnerable infants. This often means that the prognostic data presently available· is already 
outdated and contemporary admissions are likely to fare better than their predecessors did. Due 
to the time period between study and publication, most results in the literature reflect outcomes of 
babies managed in intensive care units three to five years prior to publication. Finally morbidity 
and mortality data need periodic reassessment as the survival and outcome of low birth weight 
infants continues to improve. 
The move from home to hospital, while medicalizing a natural process, improved maternal 
outcome in labour but did little to improve neonatal outcome. Immunisation programs, improving 
socia-economic conditions and sanitation improved the survival of infants. The spotlight then fell 
onto neonatal care. Early facilities did little more than to warm infants. Improvements on this 
included antibiotics and the development of more sophisticated incubators. The lungs however 
remained the limiting factor. Miniaturisation allowed ventilators developed for adults to be 
adapted to the needs of the neonates, this. lead to a substantial improvement in outcome in the 
seventies. The realisation that the administration of exogenous corticosteroids to pregnant 
women enhanced the secretion of surfactant by their babies improved the outcome of preterm 
babies in the eighties. The early nineties saw the introduction of commercially artificially 
produced surfactant, which further diminished morbidity and mortality from lung complications. 
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The' prognosis of large cohorts of pretenn infants administered artificial surfactant are now 
starting to appear in the medical literature. 
Sound ethical reasoning, like clinical decision making is based on reliable infonnation. Knowledge 
of neonatal morbidity and mortality rates is fundamental for the management of high-risk obstetric 
patients. It is essential then to access the infonnation available on the outcomes of pretenn 
infants and to assess it's validity. 
On what is the medical profession's knowledge of premature infant survival based? Intuitive 
knowledge would be considered impossible and anathemic. Personal knowledge based on 
personal experience while helpful is too limited. Most would probably resort to the medical 
literature for infonnation. Since the medical literature is usually utilised as the resource for 
prognostic prediction it is important to assess the methodology of the literature in obtaining and 
interpreting infonnation. 
1. Traditional outcomes evaluated in the literature. 
2. Clinical criteria used for prognostication. 
3. Statistics 
4. Probability 
1. Traditional outcomes evaluated in the literature. 
Traditionally the paediatric literature has identified death and clinical morbidity as the two 
outcomes they wish to evaluate for the very small pretenn infa~t2. These outcomes have been 
chosen, as they are considered medically relevant and easy to identify. As they are easy to 
identify, they are considered 'solid endpoints' in the sense that they are considered trustworthy . 
. These are endpoints chosen by medicine, based on their medical relevance and ease of 
collection. They are not necessarily the endpoints that would interest the patients themselves or 
their surrogate decision-makers. 
Death is usually referred to as a solid endpoint. A child either dies or survives, thus data on 
death should be trustworthy. However the questions is, Is this always so? A liveborn infant is 
defined as any infant that shows signs of life at birth, these include a heart beat,' pulsation of the 
umbilical cord, respiratory movement or movement of the voluntary muscles3. If a baby is 
classified as live born the baby will have to be registered as such and if it dies requires a funeral 
with all the concomitant expenses. If an extremely small liveborn pretenn infant dies in the very 
early neonatal period there is a tendency to classify the infant as stillborn so as to spare the 
parents the inconvenience and expenses of birth registration and funeral costs. Not including 
very small live borns that die in the early neonatal period gives the impression of a better 
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prognosis for extremely small live borns for survival. 
The numerous studies show variation in their results as regards morbidity and comparison 
between studies can be difficult. These difficulties are as a result of variations in diagnosis and 
definition of disabilities and the rigour, duration and timing of follow-up. 
As a group low birth weight children experience more health problems than nonnal birth weight 
children d04•5• These include prolonged stays in neonatal intensive care units and greater 
dependency on oxygen at one month after birth. There is also a tendency to more 
rehospitalisation and health-related limitations on daily activity. Asthma, respiratory tract 
infections and ear infections tend to be far commoner in these children. Pretenn delivery is more 
prevalent in socially disadvantaged mothers and preterm infants from socially disadvantaged 
backgrounds fare worse than those from a socially advantaged population are. Children that 
were of low birth weight also have a tendency to remain smaller and lighter than their peers do. 
Neurodevelopment disability is possibly the worst outcome for survivors born at extremely early 
periods of gestation 1.4. Disabilities found in surviving graduates of neonatal intensive care include 
spastic diplegia, spastic hemiplegia and ·quadriplegia with or without intellectual impainnent. 
Other neurological problems include blindness, deafness and severe epilepsy. Minor motor and 
co-ordination problems, specific learning disorders and attention deficit disorders are commonly 
recognised among school age survivors. Table 2, however shows the majority of survivors at 24 
weeks have no major residual neurological handicap. 
Infants where a poor outcome is antiCipated may be allowed to die. This also effects the 
interpretation of data as one then overestimates mortality while underestimating major morbidity. 
As can be seen outcome data can be difficult to interpret. 
2. Clinical criteria used for prognostication: 
Once 'relevant' outcomes have been identified, the next question is: Are there clinical criteria that 
we can us to predict the outcomes that we are interested in? 
Probabilities of specific outcomes are traditionally based on either gestational age or birth 
weight6. Gestational age is divided into completed weeks of pregnancy duration for example 27 
weeks would include all neonates born between the onset and completion of the 2ih week of 
gestational age. Birth weight categories have pragmatically been divided into 100g divisions for 
example from 501-600g. As will be discussed later inadvertently classifying a neonate in the 
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incorrect category could mean the difference between life and death for that infant. Both 
gestational age and birth weight, as prognostic indicators are not without their problems. 
Theoretically and empirically the better predictor of outcome is gestational age, as this reflects 
organ matumy6. Preterm infants are heterogeneous and all babies of the same gestational age 
can obviously not have exactly the same .organ maturity. This heterogeneuosity of organ maturity 
can be seen in non-identical twins where following preterm delivery only one may develop 
complications of prematurity while the other does not6. 
Organ maturity is determined from the date of conception. Gestational age is conventionally 
calculated from the first day of the last menstrual cycle and it assumed that conception followed 
this by 14 days. This may well be so in patients with 28 day cycles. In babies delivered from 
women with either shorter or longer cycles gestational age would not accurately reflect organ 
maturity. Babies born of women with shorter cycles would be maturer, while those born from 
women with longer cycles would be less mature than anticipated. While the discrepancy may 
only be a day or so, this could inadvertently classify the baby into another prognostic group. 
From one category to the next changes the prognosis, even known gestational age really 
dependent on date of conception and easily from 22 to 23 weeks which could be of critical 
significance, especially at the lower categories as it could be the difference between futility and 
treatment. Classification into the incorrect gestational age category could make the difference 
between futility and a decision to treat. 
A large percentage of pregnant women are unsure of the date of their last menstrual period for 
various reasons. Early ultrasound may help date the pregnancies, however early ultrasound 
alone also has it's inaccuracies. Additionally many women present too late in pregnancy for 
ultrasonic estimation of gestational age. Paediatricians utilise clinical scoring systems to estimate 
gestational age after delivery. However they are less accurate thn menstrual dating or early 
ultrasound and should not be used to place an infant in a prognostic category. 
As there is a correlation between gestational age and birth-weight in normal pregnancies, birth-
weight is often used as a surrogate predictor of outcome where gestational age is either unknown 
or uncertain5.6. Unfortunately even in normal pregnancies the correlation between gestational age 
and birth-weight is not particularly good7• A large 28-week baby may weigh the same as an 
appropriately grown 30-week baby or a small 32-week infant. Any correlation between 
gestational age and birth weight only holds for ·normal pregnancies and by implication preterm 
delivery cannot be considered normal. Prematurity is often associated with other obstetric 
pathology, distorting any correlation between gestational age and birth weight even further. 
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It is generally assumed that birth-weight is an easily obtainable, reliable and objective 
measurement that is available directly after the. birth of the child. In larger neonates there is a 
tendency of the nursing staff to round of the birth weight to the nearest 10g. In small neonates it 
has been reported that there is a tendency to round off the birth weight to the nearest 50g. Thus 
the outcome of a neonate with a birth weight of 880g may be rounded of to 900g placing it into a 
totally different prognostic category. 
Other than the problems discussed with regards to gestational age and birth weight, further 
factors complicate the combination of data between different units and hence their interpretation. 
Preterm infants are by no means a homogeneous group, even those of identical gestational age 
or birth-weight. There are many different reasons for preterm delivery and the prognosis is to a 
certain degree dependent on the aetiology' of the preterm delivery8,9.1O. Girls tend to outperform 
boys and small black babies do better than small Caucasian babies. Growth retarded preterm 
infants have a better prognosis than appropriately grown babies do. As delivery of very small 
infants is a relatively rare event, most studies are small and their results prone to error. So as to 
increase sample numbers to make the data more significant, there is a tendency to extend data 
collection over a large number of years, where earlier deliveries would not have reaped the 
benefits of later innovations. 
Obstetric decision making makes a considerable difference to outcome11 ,12,13. Administration of 
corticosteroids to enhance lung maturity, intrapartum monitoring, route of delivery, condition at 
birth and immediate neonatal resuscitation may all play a considerable role in outcome. There 
are some articles that suggest the greatest determinate of outcome in near viable pregnancies, is 
the decision by the obstetrician as to whether the baby will survive or not. If the obstetrician 
decides that the baby is viable it receives optimal pre- and intrapartum care, followed by vigorous 
neonatal resuscitation and pressure on the paediatric staff to admit the infant to the .neonatal 
intensive care unit. It has been shown that f.or infants of 500-750g the decision by the obstetrician 
that the baby was viable increased the chance of survival eighteen-fold9. The fact that the 
subjective perception of survival by the obstetrician reflects the best prognosis makes somewhat 
of a mockery of using either gestational age or birth weight to prospectively predict prognosis or 
act as a gatekeeper to a neonatal unit. 
Unfortunately for the obstetrician, clinical estimation of fetal weight is difficult and inaccurate, 
especially in small babies where there is a tendency to underestimate eventual birth weights. 
Ultrasonic estimation of birth weight tends to be less inaccurate and actual birth weight tends to 
be within 10% of the estimated birth weight. As tables 3 and 4 show prognosis for birth weight is 
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conventionally expressed in 100g categories and a 10% difference between the estimated and 
actual birth weight means that the two can fall into different prognostic categories. Additionally 
ultrasound facilities are not always available. These factors make it difficult to translate prognostic 
data based on birth-weight into information that will be helpful in prenatal deci~ion making 14. 
3. Statistics: 
Science is only pOSSible, as things tend to vary in an unvarying way. If all things were the same, 
then prediction would be superfluous, while if they were totally different prediction would be 
impossible. 
Traditional predictive science follows an observation, inductive and deductive prediction 
process15,16,17. Singular phenomena are observed. The unprejudiced observer records all the 
conditions under which the observation occurred and all the outcomes. The recorded outcomes 
can be regarded as statements that have been empirically derived. Since these statements 
represent the observation of a single phenomenon they may be referred to as singular 
statements. Singular statements refer toa particular outcome at a particular time and under 
particular conditions. If following repeated observations under identical circumstances the same 
outcomes are found there is a tendency to generalise or universalise the statements. The 
method of basing universal statements on accumulated singular statements is known as 
induction. These universal statements soon attain the status of laws. Using deductive reasoning 
these laws are then used to predict the outcome if similar circumstances recur. 
Extensive critique of the inductive process is beyond the scope of the dissertation. Some of the 
major criticisms will be mentioned. The idea that science begins with observation is apocryphal. 
The observer does not describe all the circumstances under which the experiment occurs, nor all 
the outcomes. Ideas of what should be recorded and what outcomes are measured are founded 
in theories of what is important. Thus theories precede observation in science and theories bias 
the observer. 
Extrapolation from singular to universal statements, the problem of induction also known as 
'Hume's problem' and has been addressed by Hume, Popper and others. Science assumes the 
regularity of nature, thus that the future will be like the past. There is no way that this can be 
established, as we cannot predict the future. The belief that universal statements arrived at by 
induction can be used to predict future events is a reflection of human psychology and not of 
logic. Inductivists aware of this criticism attempt to take refuge' behind a probabilistic 
reformulation of induction. One cannot be one hundred percent sure that, just because one has 
observed the specific outcome of a phenomenon on many occasions, the same outcome will 
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occur under similar conditions in the future. Universals arrived at by induction cannot be 
guaranteed to be absolutely true, however they are probably true. The greater the number of 
observations and the greater the variability. under which the observations are made,. the greater 
the probability that the resulting universal statement is true. Now the naIve principle of induction 
has been replaced by a probabilistic version. The reformulation being that if a large number of 
singular phenomena have been observed under differing conditions, resulted in a particular 
outcome without exception, then all similar phenomenon will probably result in the same 
outcome. The implication of the probabilistic formulation being that on the basis of a finite 
number of observations, a universal conclusion can be made that is probably true. The 
reformulation does not overcome the problem of induction as a universal statement is still 
generated from singular statements. The probability of a probabilistic universal statement being 
true can be easily refuted mathematically. The probability of the inductive universal being true is 
the number of finite singular observations divided by the number of infinite observations possible, 
thus the mathematical probability of truth remains zero however many finite observations are 
performed. 
Traditional science then predicts future events by deduction from induced truths. The universal 
statements derived by induction are then used to predict the outcome of phenomena in similar 
conditions. Now there is the extrapolation from the universal to the specific. 
Prediction of the prognosiS of babies admitted to neonatal intensive care follows exactly the same 
process; observation, induction and predictive deduction 18. Exactly the same criticisms can be 
leveled here. The observers are not unbiased; they select relatively easily obtainable 'objective' 
information such as gestational age or birth weight as prognostic criteria. They also select easily 
obtainable medically relevant outcomes to observe. They conveniently ignore a multitude of 
other data about the neonate, contingencies that occur may and do occur during the intensive 
care stay and limit outcomes to those that they can quantify relatively easily. 
In naIve inductive science observations under identical conditions give rise to identical outcomes 
and laws can be formulated. The inductivist reasoning so far has concentrated on the study of 
nature and the development of natural laws, where under similar circumstances, experiments will 
have similar outcomes. The probabilistic formulation of induction only addresses the probability 
of the truth of the outcome and should not be confused with probability theory. 
Due to patient differences prior to therapy and random occurrences during therapy, some patients 
will improve; some deteriorate while others will show no change. Despite medicine's 'romance 
with modernity, empirical observation has shown that groups of patients never have an all or 
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nothing outcome. Medicine has attempted to overcome the resulting uncertainty by utilising 
probability theory. 
4. Probability: 
Probability is a branch of mathematics that deals with the likelihood of observing one of several 
possible outcomes that can occur in an event19• In probability an event is a single happening, 
often referred to as a trial, and an outcome is one of several possible results. For example, one 
toss of a coin is an event, whereas a head or a tail is an outcome. 
Probability theory was originally developed to make predictions in games of chance. In its most 
straight forward case probability theory deals with a set of outcomes that are equally likely to 
occur. For example if a card is drawn from a deck (a random event), the outcome is equally likely 
. to be a heart, a diamond, a spade or a club. In this random event the probability of the card 
drawn being of a specific kind is found by dividing the number of outcomes of the specific kind 
(say spades) by the total number of possible outcomes. 
Probability theory has developed and there are now two main interpretations, the subjectivists 
and the frequentialists2o. The former depends on our expectations and observations of events. 
The later dominates in medical statistical and epidemiological analysis at present. Here 
probability can be viewed as the relative frequency of an outcome in a long string of events. The 
frequentialist view is also referred to as the empirical approach to probability, as probabilities are 
based on outcome data from a number of random sample events taken from a defined 
population. The law of large numbers implies that as sampling becomes larger, observed 
frequencies of outcomes of events approach theoretical probabilities. Large populations show 
inherent stability and perturbations due to individual variations becomes smoothed out. 
Probability theory has merely been designed to address the uncertainty of outcome and while 
acknowledging the complexity of the phenomena, contingencies and outcomes studied has done 
nothing to resolve these problems. 
Individual studies usually report point probabilities for specific outcomes in the population studied. 
If in the population studied there were 400 infants weighing between 700g~800g and 40 died, the 
point probability for the outcome death in the 400 events (patients) would be 0,1. This point 
probability refers only to the outcome death in the population studied. Medical scientists often 
wish to know if a similar trial was repeated under similar circumstances how similar would the 
results be? For this reason point probabilities are usually accompanied by 95% confidence 
intervals. Ninety five percent confidence. intervals are mathematically calculated and were a 
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similar trial repeated 100 times, then theoretically the point probability would be between the 95% 
confidence intervals. Following the law of large numbers the larger the trail the closer the 95% 
confidence intervals as the closer the trial results will be to the natural frequencies. 
Probability theory may tell us what the probability of an outcome is in a population. Using the 
example alluded to above the probability of death in the population studied was 10%. Two major 
issues however remain unresolved. POint probabilities derived from medical research refer to 
populations of patients and not individual patients. How can we extrapolate population-derived 
data onto individual patients? Also although the probability of a particular group of patients for 
death may be 70%, for a particular patient it can only be 0 or 100%. In essence what we 
communicate to the patient is our perception of the probability of the outcome. 
The problems of extrapolating from populations to individuals can be illustrated by the following 
cases: The smallest surviving unaffected infant was a severely growth restricted female delivered 
in 1991 at a gestational age of 27 weeks. Her birth weight was 280g; her 120-day sojourn in 
intensive care was followed by an uneventful earty childhood. She is at present progressing well 
at school and has no identified sequelae of her extremely low birth weight21 .22 . This normal 
outcome occurred despite the fact that her mother did not receive steroids prior to delivery and 
the infant did not receive artificial surfactant in the neonatal period. The same authors have 
reported another case with a birth weight of 380g and a similar excellent outcome. Futility will be 
discussed in detail later, however all large population based studies would have considered 
management of these cases to be futile. 
Synthesis: 
There can be little doubt that for the individual patient there is considerable uncertainty about 
outcome. This uncertainty is based upon the inherent mistrust in the inductive method. We live 
in a world of complexity, diversity and ultimately uncertainty. The uncertainty may be denied by 
authoritative dogmatism. An example of this is the 1000g threshold for neonatal intensive care 
admission. An alternative approach to the uncertain prognosis of the extremely small neonate is 
discussed in the chapter on individual and comparative utility. 
The data in the tables (Appendix A) show the survival of infants admitted to neonatal intensive 
care. What other research and historical reflection has shown is that those neonates refused 
admission to neonatal intensive care fare far worse. The smaller the infant the worse the 
prognosis. There can be little doubt that small preterm neonates are extremely vulnerable. 
While absolute prognostic certainty is elusive, the outcomes of infants at the extremes of the 
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spectrum appear to be relatively stable. Despite new technologies and innovations that continue 
to push back the boundaries of viability, cases exist in which all the known evidence lead the 
decision-makers to conclude that aggressive intervention is futile. In cases of probable futility it is 
. morally legitimate to withhold or withdraw therapy23. In contrast to the cases of probable futility, 
cases also exist where prevailing knowledge and experience suggest an excellent outcome. It is 
that group of babies between the extremes where uncertainty prevails. 
Axioms 
A 280-g baby has survived with no residual morbidity. 
There have been improvements in morbidity and mortality over time. 
The smaller or more preterm the infant the more likely it is that there will be either mortality or 
morbidity. 
All data are based on population studies and any probabilities are for populations. For the 
individual the risk of outcome for death cannot be given as percentage, it is either zero or one 
hundred percent. 
Prognostic data should be used as a road map. 
Basically have to accept that while when evaluating the chances of survival of a population we 
can be reasonably accurate when attempting to prognosticate for the individual we are confronted 
with prognostic uncertainty. 
Babies above 1350g or 31 weeks should have a survival of virtually 100%. 
Even the majority of survivors at 24 weeks have no major residual neurological handicap. 
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Chapter 4 
Individual and comparative utility 
There are essentially two co-existing neonatal intensive care allocation and decision-making 
processes. On the one hand, microallocation decisions at the level of the individual patient 
involving clinical decisions. In neonatology the patient is unable to make these decisions and 
hence they are made by surrogate decision-makers. On the other hand, macroallocation 
decisions. These are the planning decisions made on behalf of the community by health care 
jurisdictions. These decisions include issues such as whether or not facilities should be provided, 
where provided facilities should be located B:nd who qualifies to utilize them. . 
Decisions have to be made at both levels. Although decision-makers and factors influencing 
decision-making differ between the two levels, essentially both utilize a similar process. Both 
require some idea of the anticipated outcomes of alternative decisions that can be made. 
Assessment of potential outcomes, expressed quantitatively and qualitatively, is best explained 
by decision analysis theory. Decision analysis theory suggests that three questions should be 
addressed when comparing decisions 1.2,3: 
1. What decisions can be made? 
2. What are the probabilities (p) of a particular outcome for a particular decision? This 
represents a quantitative assessment. 
3. What is the utility (u) of each outcome? This is a qualitative assessment. 
If these questions can be answered then it is relatively easy to calculate the anticipated utility of 
each decision :E(p xu). 
While appearing straight forward, there are obviously problems with this approach. It is beyond 
the scope of the thesis to analyze decision analysis in full. However it will be briefly addressed. 
Appropriate alternative decisions that can be entertained are usually relatively easy to identify. 
Probability determination of outcomes is difficult and has been more comprehensively discussed 
under prognosis. Problems with qualitative assessment of outcome and quantification of 
qualitative assessment of outcome are addressed below. The limitations of decision analysis 
, 
must also be remembered. Decision analysis is merely a method to allow comparison of the 
anticipated outco~e of alternative decision~ available. Final decision making is far broader and 
other than taking cognisance of potential outcomes also tends to involve, amongst others, 
personnel, social, political, ethical and philosophical issues4. 
Individual utility: 
How does one qualify outcome for an individual? If the patient were competent then the patient 
would assess qualitative utility according to their own beliefs and values. Health related quality of 
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life can be measured in many ways, perhaps the simplest and most time honoured is the simple 
question by the doctor to his patient, 'How are you? '. In the absence of competence, these 
judgements are far more difficult. 
If one wishes to compare outcomes qualitatively, some form of standardization is necessary. 
Utility measurement is one such approach5.6. The term utility may potentially lead to confusion. 
Utility does not refer to the usefulness of the individual or of the health state in which the 
individual is found. Utility refers to the desirability or preference that individuals exhibit for a 
condition or outcome. Utility is a cardinal measure of the strengths of an individual's partiality for 
a condition or outcome. 
Medicine has a tendency to attempt to numerically quantify qualitative assessment; there are 
numerous ways of doing this. The desirability of health states can be arbitrarily standardized on a 
scale from zero to unity5. This means quantifying the qualitative outcome between zero and one. 
The quantitative value of the qualitative outcome is a reflection of the decision-makers preference 
for an outcome. Utility values for outcome are usually assessed relative to two extremes, referred 
to as anchor states. The commonly used anchor states are death, assigned a value of zero and 
full health, assigned a value of one. Even the most solid end-point, death, allocated a score of 
zero is questionable. Not all deaths are the same; if they were then euthanasia would not be an 
issue in medicine. 
Different decision-makers can be utilised to assign utility values to particular health states7• Utility 
value assignees may include patients or their surrogates, medical personnel, the general public 
or politicians. At the level of individual utility and decision-making, the patient is probably best 
qualified to assign quantitative values to utilities. The patient is informed about the different 
outcomes and utility scores are assigned according to the patient's beliefs and values. 
Alternatively patients with particular conditions may be requested to determine their utility for their 
particular state. The potential for subjectivity can be appreciated when one considers the 
commonly observed phenomena that two patients with the same clinical condition often have 
dramatically different responses. 
Qualitative assessment of long term outcome in surviving preterm neonates is obviously more 
difficult than in adults. Firstly, competent adults can assign utility scores according to their own 
beliefs and values. In neonates, surrogate decision-makers have to assign utility scores. In 
assessing neonatal outcome and individual utility, thought experiments have be performed with 
surrogates in which particular health states are described to the surrogates and those individuals 
allot a utility score to each health state. Secondly in competent adults the potential outcomes can 
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be compared to the normality that they used to enjoy. The preterm neonate that survives with 
sequelae will have had those sequelae for the whole of their cognitive life. How does one 
quantitatively assess a condition such as blindness for somebody that has never experienced 
vision? Are they worse or better off than individuals that could previously see?8 Some may 
assume handicapped children experience suffering and this causes torment in the family. 
Alternatively they may assume that individuals with sub-average intelligence must be miserable. 
When quantifying utility as a surrogate one must be careful not to merely project our own desires 
and fears. Some of the lost quality of life may also be more a reflection of society's interaction 
with the individual, rather than an inherent problem with the individual themselves. 
Utility assessments are essentially a quality of life assessment and assigning a score between 
zero and one may be philosophically extremely difficult for some decision makers9. To the 
vitalist, mere biological life alone is an end-point that is not only.acceptable. It is an outcome 
worthy of striving for. To the non-vitalist mere biological life of the permanently comatose patient 
is not beneficial unless there is a real possibility of either a diagnostic or prognostic error. To 
anyone but vitalists, balancing benefits and burdens pre-supposes the concept of quality of life. 
One has to have some concept of the type of life that a patient would live after a medical 
intervention. Surrogate decision-makers should be extremely careful with quality of life 
judgements and remember that quality of life for the patient should not be confused with the 
quality or the value of the patient's life to others. The criticism has been made that quality of life 
decisions shifts the focus away from whether treatment is beneficial to the patient, to whether or 
not the patient's lives are beneficial to them 10. Quality of life judgements are not about the social 
worth of the patient, but about the value of life for the person that must live it. One way to for 
surrogate decision-makers to focus on the value of life for the person who must live it may be the 
concept of best interests. 
Decision analysis on the individual level facilitates normative quantification of the anticipated 
outcomes of particular decisions2. Outcomes of clinical decisions can now be semi-quantitatively 
compared. Anticipated outcomes are now available. The final decision taken, while obviously 
taking cognisance of the outcomes of the available decisions, is usually based on variable 
combinations of social, political, ethical or philosophical inputs. Outcome analysis where the 
results of the outcomes analyzed directly and solely influence management is necessarily 
utilitarian in nature. 
Individual utility and treatment obligations: 
Macroallocation determines provision of facilities or not. If the facility is available and an 
individual requires the facility then evaluation of individual utility is important for clinical decision 
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making. How can individual utility analysis influence surrogate decision making? In neonatal care 
surrogate decision-makers utilize decision analysis to evaluate the likely outcome of different 
management options. The best interest standard determines that they should make their 
decision based, in a utilitarian manner, on the balance of benefits over burdens. 
Beauchamp and Childress have suggested that when considering treatment on the individual 
level there are three moral categories 10: 
1. Obligatory to treat (wrong not to treat). 
2. Optional whether to treat or not. 
3. Obligatory not to treat (wrong to treat). 
In the vast majority of patients there is an obligation to treat. It will be argued that in the face of 
uncertainty as is often the case in neonatal care, there is also an initial obligation to treat. The 
second category they subdivide into neutral. and supererogatory. The neutral sub-category refers 
to it being morally neutral whether or not a doctor provides therapy or a surrogate authorizes or 
refuses therapy. In the supererogatory sub-category providing treatment is considered 
supererogatory, while not providing it would not be morally blameworthy. It has been suggested 
and will be expanded upon below that treatment may be morally optional if considered futile or if 
the burdens of treatment are deemed to exceed the benefits. The category of obligation not to 
treat is rare and would include the refusal by a competent, autonomous individual not to treat. It 
may also be argued that in the presence of scarcity of resources, futility or where burdens 
considerably outweigh benefits, that there is an obligation not to treat. 
Futility 
The word futility is derived from the Latin (uti/is, that literally means 'that which easily pours oui', 
which has come to mean serving no purpose in English. Futilis is a word associated with Greek 
Mythology, in which the daughters of Danaus, king of Argos murdered their husbands on their 
wedding night, on his instruction. They were condemned by the gods to collect water for eternity 
using leaky sieves. A futile action is one that cannot achieve the goals of the action, no matter 
how often repeated11 . Futile acts are ineffective and incapable of achieving a desired result or 
goal. 
Futility has to be distinguished from similar terminology12. Futility should not be confused with 
impossibility, where actions are either physically or logically impossible. Futility should also not 
be confused with acts that are so complex, that though theoretically possible, are at present 
implausible. The production of an infant entirely outside the uterus may be theoretically po~sible, 
but with current technology is implausible. Hopelessness should also be distinguished from 
futility. Futility refers to the objective quality of an action; hopelessness describes a subjective 
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attitude. Hope and hopelessness bear' more relation to desire, faith, denial and other 
psychological responses than to the objective possibility or probability that actions being 
contemplated will be successful or not. Something plausible, although unlikely, is never 
hopeless, because hope is what human beings summon up to seek a miracle against 
overwhelming odds. It is logically acceptable to say that you know that an action is probably 
futile, but that you have hope. Such a statement would express two facts. The first about the 
perceived outcome of the situation and the second about the psychological state of the speaker. 
The distinction between futility and hopelessness may lead to conflict between medical personnel 
and parents. 
Earlier this century all medications were considered to be effective. They brought about the effect 
that their names described. Emetics could be relied upon to cause vomiting, purgatives to cause 
laxation; sudorifics to cause sweating. According to the medical theories of the time, medication' 
when prescribed was always considered to be beneficial. Failure of a patient to get better was a 
defect of nature, not of the doctor or of the treatment. 
Modern medicine however, through improved statistical analysis, has come to recognize the 
important distinction between effect and benefit13. Therapy may be effective, however the goals 
that will be achieved may not desirable. The goal of medical therapy is not merely to cause some 
effect on either the patient's anatomy, physiology or biochemistry, but to benefit the patient as a 
whole. The ultimate goal of any therapy should be to either improve the patient's prognosis, 
comfort, well being or general state of health. Any therapy that fails to provide such benefit, even 
if it does produce measurable effect, may be considered to be futile. Futility is temporally 
unstable as new innovations make the previously futile possible. 
Like decision analysis the term futility has a quantitative and qualitative element. Futility may 
refer to an improbability of an event occurring, a semi-numeric evaluation, or to the quality of an 
outcome that treatment will produce. Determining futility is similar to decision analysis, with one 
important distinction. In decision analYSiS, the decision to use a particular procedure is based on 
the joint product of the probability of success and the quality of the outcome L(p x u) 12. In the 
case of futility probability and utility are independent final determinants. Either ,a poor probability 
of any successful outcome or a good probability of poor outcome may be used to declare an 
action futile. 
Burdens outweigh benefits 
While the concept is self-explanatory, for a surrogate decision-maker it can be extremely difficult 
to adjudicate. Like futility the evaluation of benefrts and burdens is subjective. 
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Treatment optional or wrong? 
Beauchamp and Childress feel that futility changes the relationship between doctor and patient, 
there is no longer an obligation to treat10. the concept is not new14• Hippocrates felt that it was 
improper for doctors to engage in practices that are hopeless. He also felt it improper to cause 
more burden than benefit. In both instances he felt that there could come a time when we should 
stop treating. The first notion was more concerned with protecting the virtue of the profession, 
while the second focused primarily on concern for the good of the patient. Plato felt that the 
responsible doctor should not pander those that should not be treated no matter how rich they 
were. 
The principle of nonmaleficence does not insist on the maintenance of biological life, irrespective 
of the patient's pain, suffering or discomfort. If on the balance of utilities the burdens outweigh 
the benefits there is no obligation to treat 10. 
We have now established that there is no obligation to treat in the presence of futility or when the 
burdens outweigh the benefits. The question is; is it ever wrong to treat under these 
circumstances? This opinion may be supported by appeals to distributive justice. Distributive 
justice will be addressed in more detail later. The argument to support an obligation not to treat 
are briefly detailed below. 
Resources can be considered wasted from society's point of view if it is known beforehand that 
either the chance of a good outcome is poor or the chance of a bad outcome is good15. The 
concept of waste here should not be confused when health resources have been used for an 
infant with a real likelihood of a good outcome, that subsequently dies 16. Limiting care with 
marginal utility fits into the scheme of fair allocation of scarce resources or distributive justice 10. 
Futility and burdens outweighing benefits are extremely important concepts if they oblige non-
treatment, especially if the non-treatment will probably lead to death. These terms are not value 
neutral. There are uncertain probabilities and no consensus how seldom treatment has to work 
to be deemed futile 16. Utility quantification is a value judgement made by surrogate decision-
makers. These judgements should never be used as a moral trump card, if there is not 
consensus amongst decision~makers the whole situation should be reconsidered. 
Comparative utility: 
The discipline of health economics has developed so as to evaluate and compare the resource 
consumption of healthcare programs 17.18. Health care is dependent on resources that are not 
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infinite, be they provided by the recipient of the care, a third party insurer or the government. It is 
no longer enough to claim that interventions merely work or are effective, they have to be 
economically competitive. They have to compete for the finite heaHhcare resources. When third 
party financiers consider an intervention they consider the costs of paying for it. Is a particular 
health procedure or service program worth doing when compared with other things that we can 
do with the same resources? In deciding to use resources in one health program or treatment, 
the community foregoes the opportunity to use those same resources in another competing 
activity. It is generally accepted that neonatal intensive care improves outcome of preterm 
neonates, however neonatal intensive care must compete with other heaHh programs for 
allocation of heaHhcare funding. The distribution of expenditure within health care services must 
be justified. As can be seen, economic evaluations are predicated by a number of assumptions. 
Resources are scarce, relevant aHematives have to be identified, alternatives can be qualified, 
quantified and compared. Rational choices can be made and justified on economic grounds. 
The perceived scarcity of resources will be challenged and choices of distribution of resources 
will be addressed when discussing distributive justice. Methods of economic comparison will be 
further addressed here. In order to compare different health programs there has to be a single 
unit. As the comparisons are for economic evaluation, the numerator is inevitably in monetary 
units. 
Economic evaluation, which relates mainly to planning decisions, strives to obtain comparative 
assessments of costs and consequences of a wide range of heaHh care programs, the logic being 
that, if it is accepted that resources are limited, priorities for heaHh services investments need to 
be assignedlO• There are several forms of economic evaluation, but all forms compare inputs into 
a health care program with some combination of outputs. Inputs include costs to the heaHh care 
sector and to patients and their families in providing care as well as indirect costs such as 
revenue lost due to individuals not being able to work. There may also be an attempt to calculate 
intangible costs associated with therapy, such as pain and suffering. Whereas the valuation of 
costs is relatively straightforward, though not without controversy, the evaluation and 
quantification of the qualitative benefits of heaHh care, particularly the intangible benefits is a 
source of debate 
Outputs of heaHh care programs can be assessed in many ways 10. Firstly, they may be 
measured fair1y simply as number of cases treated or number of years of life gained. Secondly 
the outputs may be measured in monetary terms. Economic evaluation where outputs are 
measured in monetary terms is referred to as cost-benefit analysis. Some categories of benefit 
are relatively easy to quantify monetarily, especially if financial in nature themselves, such as 
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saving in health care as a result of improved health. Other more intangible benefits, such as the 
value to the patient or their families of feeling healthier, are obviously far more difficult to quantify. 
If patients requiring the health intervention could die either if they did not receive the intervention 
or as a result of the intervention, those performing cost-benefit analysis would be in the difficult 
position of having to allocate a financial value to human life. Cost-benefit analysis is unpopular 
as outcome is measured in financial terms. Health should be seen as an end in itself and not as 
a financial commodity. To overcome these problems the outputs of health care may be 
measured according to the value of the recipient's health state, in other words utility is measured. 
Evaluation with utility as the denominator is referred to as cost-utility analysis. 
The lifetime of an individual can be considered to consist of two major components: quantity of 
life and quality of lifes.6. Quantity of life is the time interval from birth to death, while quality of life 
refers to life's quality at each point between.birth and death. Quality of life is a broad concept that 
incorporates all aspects of an individuals existence. Many factors external to the health domain 
such as economic, cultural, political, environmental and spiritual contribute to quality of life. 
There should be a distinction between quality of life as an all-inclusive concept incorporating all 
the factors that impact upon an individual's life and health related quality of life, which includes 
only those factors that are part of an individual's health. Health related quality of life is a less. 
broad concept than the all-embarrassing quality of life and only relates to the health asp~cts of an 
individual. The unit conventionally used to report utility in comparative assessment is quality of 
life, although a more appropriate term would be health related quality of life. 
The principles of quantification of quality of life assessment are similar to those of individual utility 
assessment. The desirability of outcomes is standardized on a scale from zero to one. The 
quantitative value of the qualitative outcome is a reflection of the decision-maker's preference for 
an outcome. Utility values for outcome are assessed relative to two extremes, or anchor states. 
The least desirable anchor states are allocated a value of zero and the most desirable anchor 
state, usually full health, assigned a value of one. People seek health; thus each year of good 
quality healthy life expectancy is allocated a value of one. Each year of poor quality unhealthy life 
expectancy is then allocated a value of less than one. The value below one of each year of poor 
quality life expectancy is dependent on the degree of incapacity, the greater the incapacity the 
greater the losss,6. When quality of life values are combined with prognostic information, it allows 
calculation of quality adjusted life years (QAL Ys). QAL Y is a composite indicator that combines 
morbidity and mortality to provide a quantitative measure of losses from a condition or gains from 
an intervention. 
Factors determined and quantified in neonatal survival evaluate neurological function like physical 
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mobility and coordination, intellectual capacity and ability to interact socially 19.20. Respiratory 
dysfunction is also qualified and quantified. In individual utility assessment the patient or a 
surrogate assigns values to outcomes. In comparative utility assessment patients with particular 
outcomes may be requested to assign values for their outcomes relative to full health. 
Altematively thought experiments may be performed in which particular health states are 
described to individuals and those individuals allot a utility score to each health state. It may be 
argued that when economic analysis seeks to inform planning decisions the relevant utility values 
are those of either the general public or their elected representatives. 
The concept of QAL Ys is based on numerous assumptions 10. These include that the only 
function of health services are health maximization and that healthy life is equivalent to quality 
life. Only selected utilities are evaluated and these are often based on the ease of identification 
and numeration of the qualitative short-fall. Qualification and quantification of any dysfunction is 
. subjective and dependent on the opinion of the groups whose opinion was solicited. Qualitative 
assessment is normative and interpretation of the good life and the allocation of a numerical. 
value may give a false impression of objectivity to the unwary. QAL Ys is an egalitarian concept 
as each year of life is equal. QAL Ys values individuals in direct proportion to their expectation of 
life at their current age and advantages the young and discriminates against the elderly as saving 
the life of a young person will produce more QAL Ys than that of an older person .. 
In cost-utility analysis, the input or numerator is the financial cost and is reported in a monetary 
unit and the denominator or utility unit is the quality adjusted life year. Thus, cost-utility analysis 
is reported as cost per quality adjusted life year. Cost-utility ratios have little intrinsic meaning by 
themselves but can be compared with ratios for other health interventions. Because many 
evaluations have been performed, it is hardly surprising that there has been a tendency to 
construct' league tables' of interventions in terms of their costs per quality adjusted life_yea~1.22. 
Most league tables present data for debate and do not specify any cut-off point beyond which 
programs should not be provided. 
League tables are usually constructed using studies performed at different times, by different 
investigators on different patients, often in different countries. A study performed at a particular 
time, merely represents a snapshot of the situation at the time of the study. Making provision for 
inflation is one way of trying to allow for comparison of studies that are not contemporaneous. 
Presumably different methodologies for calculating utility and costs of utilities would have been 
utilised. Finally comparisons are made across disparate fields. 
League table analysis is further complicated in the case of neonatal care. The advantage to 
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younger patients where QAL Ys are utilised in the denominator has already been discussed. 
Neonatal technology is rapidly changing and costing changes concurrently. The introduction of 
artificial surfactant has dropped the cost of initial intensive care and increased the number of 
survivors, both intact and impaired. The increase in number of impaired survivors leads to 
increased long-term care costs. As smaller infants require more care and have a worse outcome 
despite this, the cost per QALY gained, increases as the gestational age or birthweight drops23. 
Cost-utility comparisons, comparing neonatal care to other forms of health care have been 
performed in the United States24. It was found that the cost per QAL Y gained for an infants 
weighing between 1000g and 1499g was less than that for treating hypertension in 40 year old 
men. Even though cost per QAL Y gained increases with decreasing birthweight, the cost for 
infants weighing between 500g and 999g is less than that for coronary artery surgery or renal 
dialysis. In the USA the total annual direct costs of neonatal intensive care for small infants is 
less than one third of the costs of health care of smoking related disease and less than two thirds 
of the direct health costs of alcohol abuse. 
Despite all the criticism it is essential to bear in mind that decisions have to be made about the 
allocation of resources. Cost-utility analysis is probably the most sophisticated form of economic 
evaluation available at present and from the health economy viewpoint has an important role to 
play25. Those utilising cost-utility analysiS league tables for economic evaluation and comparison 
of health interventions for economic advice on determining resource allocation should always 
bear the criticisms in mind. Advisors and macroallocation decision-makers should exercise 
caution, care and intelligence when using cost-utility analysis. 
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Macroeconomics 
We have no money so we must think 
37 
Rutherford, British physicist 
Resource allocation at the global level ?f decision-making, called macroallocation, is usually 
distinguished from microallocation or rationing decisions about which individuals receive what 
services 1• Macroallocation decisions determine how much money is allocated to health care in 
the country. These decisions determine how much the central or provincial government is willing 
to allocate to health care as opposed to education, defense, the environment or other social 
goals. Macroallocation decisions determine how much of a given resource ultimately is made 
available to ration among individual patients. Rationing occurs at the level of the patient, where it 
is decided whether or not a patient should receive a treatment that is in limited supply. 
The dissertation in essence addresses microallocation decisions; which babies should and should 
not receive neonatal intensive care? However it would be na·ive not to briefly address 
macroallocation in a discussion of this nature. The reason for the brevity is that many articles 
have been written on the issue and final decisions are probably more motivated by political than 
philosophical theory. 
Few would dispute that there is a need for reorganisation of health care in South Africa. The 
system is inequitable and does not provide for the health care needs of the majority of the 
population, particularly those in remote rural areas2,3, There is at present a two-tier system: the 
private sector for those with a degree of financial freedom and the public sector for those that 
cannot afford private care. By the 1990s health expenditure in South Africa consumed almost 8% 
of the gross national budget. By 1992 in the private sector, 60% of the country's doctors spent 
64% of the health budget on the 17% ofthe population that could afford private health care2. The 
private service continues to expand and change demographically as many young blacks are 
employed and join the insured. The public sector serving 83% of the population utilises only 36% 
of money spent on health and requires urgent redres~2. 
Buchanan argues that there are nine elements necessary for a fair and just healthcare system4• 
The core three being; access, that is universal, of adequate level and without undue burden to the 
patient are based on the United States President's Commission on Medical Ethics. Fair 
distribution of financial costs of ensuring universal access of adequate care, fair distribution of 
rationing and a capacity for improvement to a more just system are three further necessary 
el.ements proposed by Buchanan. He describes three further elements: the system should 
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educate and train appropriate numbers and types of health workers, should enable the effective 
pursuit of appropriate high quality biomedical research and implement in a cost-effective manner 
findings of relevant research. 
Buchanan's nine elements appear reasonable and will not be further debated, other than to 
briefly address the following issues: What is basic medical care? and How should health care be 
distributed? Basic medical care may either be interpreted as the bare minimum of medical care 
or that level of medical care necessary for survival and adequate functioning. Basic health 
services may thus mean the minimum of primary health services or it may mean highly 
sophisticated neonatal intensive care to support and allow the survival of small pretenn 
neonates5.6.7• Definition of basic medical care is important to give content to Buchanan's 
elements and as will be seen later to give content to patients right's in tenns of the Constitution. 
As neonatal care units supported by public funding are available, I have taken basic health 
services to extend beyond the bare minimum and to be interpreted as those services basic to 
survival and adequate functioning. 
Unspecified claims to fair distribution are extremely broad as different theories of distributive 
justice advocate different material principles that identify relevant properties that individuals must 
possess to qualify for benefits or burdens. As there is no overarching theory of social justice to 
balance competing claims between morally relevant criteria such as need and benefit: fair, open 
and publicly defensible resource allocation procedures are critical8. Any theory of distributive 
justice for health care leading to government policy should also be well published, coherent and 
consistent, as should be any government policy emanating from the theory. An example of lack 
of consistency between theory and policy may be the coercion of newly qualified doctors to 
perfonn community service. If a decision is made to concentrate on primary health care and 
diminish the role of medical personnel in the system then coerced employment of graduates may 
be more a reflection of political expedience than theory initiated policy. Surely engineers and 
builders of basic infrastructure should precede the doctors? 
Some issues have to be addressed prior to continuing9: 
1. Is there a shortage of medical resources? 
2. Are there financial constraints? 
3. What is the role of medicine in health? 
4. If poverty plays a role in sickness, will redistribution of wealth result in more health? 
Since the thesis discusses the issue of macroallocation of health services, the first issue to 
resolve is: Is there a shortage of medical resources? If rationing is the allocation of scarce 
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resources, then prior to deciding whether and how to ration, the threshold question must be; Are 
the resources scarce? If not, there is no need to ration as there is plenty for all. If resources are 
indeed scarce, the question whether to ration is no longer relevant. The question now becomes 
how to ration? 
Very few health care goods or services are inherently limited by scarcity of supply in nature. The 
. most obvious example is organs for transplantation. Even this may be an artificial scarcity; there 
may be enough organs, but a reluctance to donate them. Some drugs are limited in supply as 
they are derived from nature. However, most drugs can be created by synthetic means and the 
natural limit disappears. Limitations on most medical supplies is almost inevitably a function of 
the money available to be spent on them. 
The other major component in the health care sector is the individuals that deliver the services: 
the health care workers. There is no shortage of people to fulfil these services. If we are told 
there is a shortage of nurses, it is not because there are not enough people to serve as nurses. It 
is either as not enough people have been trained to provide nursing services, due to a reluctance 
to finance nursing colleges or not enough money is being paid to nursing personnel to persuade 
people to train as nurses, or for trained nurses to remain in the profession. The raw materials, 
people, exist. It is money that turns human resources into health care workers, money to pay for 
training, money to pay for delivery of services, just as money ultimately turns raw materials into 
products. 
If there is no natural shortage of drugs, technologies or health care workers why are health care 
services often considered scarce resources? Economists believe that money is merely a means 
of valuing capital, labour or raw materials and how we allocate our money reflects how we value 
our resources. Financial limits on specific resources are the functional equivalent of natural limits 
on the resources. Natural limits impose absolute scarcity, while financial limits create artificial or 
relative shortages. Health care restrictions are thus in reality artificial restrictions and reflect the 
value that society places on health care when compared to other resources. 
It has been established that in essence there is no absolute shortage of health· resources. Any 
health care shortage is artificial and economic in nature. The question that then has to be 
addressed is; Are there financial constraints? Internally a recession, limited tax base, an 
inefficient and large public service and corruption are all threatening the economy 10. Externally 
foreign aid to developing countries has been decreasing since the mid-1980s. The waning 
superpower rivalry and the increased need for help in Eastern Europe following the collapse of 
communism has made Africa even less significant in the eyes of Western aid agencies 10. The 
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low gold price, almost unsustainable debt burden, weakening foreign exchange and world 
recession have exacerbated the financial situation. There can be little doubt that there are severe 
financial constraints. Also, theoretically, health care could consume most if not all of even a 
booming economy, thus there must be financial restrictions11.1.2.13. 
Our health service shortages are artificial and a reflection of our economic woes. From this one 
would presume that if we could improve ecol)omically we could improve our health services and 
improve the health of the nation. This reasoning is based on the classical key assumption that 
health services are the major determinants of health status, so that inequalities in the latter are 
largely a result of differential access to. the former. The salient question prior to implementing a 
policy based on this reasoning is, What is the contribution of medical care to health 
improvement? 
The assumption that improved health services improve national health is based on the fact that 
there were impressive reductions in mortality iii the last century. These reductions have 
benefited almost all countries in the world and all social groups, although with enormous 
disparities in the extent and the pace of the progress. The coincidence of this fall in mortality with 
the explosion in medical technologies led to the almost obvious conclusion that the latter had to 
be the reason for the reduction in the former. This certainty was short lived. 
In the 1950s, precisely when most countries were beginning to report important decreases in 
mortality, criticisms began to be leveled against conventional wisdom. In 1959, Rene Dubos 
published his now classic book Mirage of Heaffh l4• In it he demonstrated that mortality had 
begun to decline in the West long before the formulation of the microbial theory of disease and 
the introduction of the magic bullets in the form of antibiotics. At the same time the physician and 
demographer Thomas McKeown looked at what was responsible for health in a population. He 
came to the conclusion that the reasons for declining mortality were to be found primarily in better 
living conditions, especially clean water, nutrition, housing, sanitation and environmental 
improvement 15. It would appear that medical services have a small effect on health status, 
compared with socio-economic determinants. Progress in reducing health inequalities will be 
achieved not so much by increasing access to medical care as changing the· social conditions 
and lifestyles that account for the persistence of such inequalities. Better public health, housing, 
sanitation, electrification, education, roads, public transport, pollution control and campaigns 
against tobacco and alcohol abuse, can probably do much more than curative medical services in 
extending quality of life and life expectancy. 
If poverty plays a role in sickness, will redistribution of wealth result in more health? The 'Black 
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report' showed that inequalities in health are based on socio-economic position 16. Poor health is 
clearly associated with poverty, a term that is often mixed up with other terms such as inequality, 
disadvantage, alienation and marginalisation. Reports equating poverty with poor health have 
lead to the deprivation model of sickness 16. The deprivation model assumes that deprivation is 
an absolute state. with causes sickness and early death through malnutrition, overcrowding, 
starvation, disease and other identified and unidentified factors. The deprivation model's 
proponents claim that redistribution of wealth and financial resources would abolish poverty and 
improve the health of community. They feel that redistribution of wealth is the single most 
effective strategy for improving public health and egalitarian policies flow directly from and are 
justified by this philosophy. Equality is good for national health. 
The deprivation model assumes that at higher levels of income and wealth, health benefits 
plateau; Further increases in income or wealth produce diminishing levels of returns in health 
gain .. Thus if money is redistributed from the wealthy to the poor, the poor will gain health but the 
rich will not loose health as they have already crossed ttie threshold of financial health and are 
some distance along the plateau. Man is born well and that health should be maintained. 
Poverty is caused by human agency; deprivation is an infringement of the right to health. 
An alternative model to the health deprivation model to explain socio-economic differentials is the 
salutogenic modeI16.17.18. Salutogenesis is the process of health creation; as opposed to 
pathogenesis which is the process of disease causation. Rather than regarding pathological 
breakdown as an unusual situation, salutogenesis regards health as an abnormal state. Life is 
maintained in the presence of endemic environmental hostility to the organism. Health, far from 
being a natural state or a universal right is an achievement, a privilege and often the 
consequence of good luck. 
People fortunate enough to enjoy the advantages of a higher socio-economic position are more 
able to build up resilience and resistance than those below them. This makes a longer life span 
more probable, as they are able to accumulate more positive health. Instead of sickness being 
caused by deprivation, salutogenesis sees health as caused by socio-economic advantage. Man 
is conceived and delivered in a vulnerable state, good health is possible by soCial arrangement. 
Positive health is the achievement of a positive environment. 
If health is salutogenic and made possible by advantage, then the redistribution of resources is 
not an attractive option for improving the health of the nation, as redistribution works by removing 
advantage. If the relationship between socio-economic position and health is progressive and 
positive then redistribution of wealth may merely transf'~r health from the rich to the poor. There 
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would be losers as well as gainers. Egalitarian policies do not so much create health, as move it 
around. Such redistribution mayor may not be desirable; the point is that it is not self-evidently 
the right solution. 
Inequalities in health may be less a sign of failure to address deprivation than an unintended 
consequence of success. Instead of redistributing a fixed quality of health from rich to poor, it 
may be more meaningful to create more health. This can be done by stimulating the economy 
and reducing the proportion of the population at the lower end of the socio-economic scale and 
increasing the proportion with higher socio-economic positions. This would continue the 
prevailing social trend towards financial betterment and presumably also the health trend of 
increasing average life expectancy. There would not be redistribution of wealth and with it health, 
but a net economic and health gain. Everybody would gain and nobody would loose. This type 
of strategy would allow many to gain the advantages at present only enjoyed by the few, rather 
than leveling the few down to the disadvantage of the many. 
The implications are that a highly educated, highly skilled, high waged, economically expanding 
predominantly middle class is good for the health of the nation, despite its accidental promotion of 
inequality. Redistribution of income, resources and consequences has little to offer as regards 
improving the health of the people; it merely robs Peter to pay Paul. Whether such an 
economically expanding middle class society is desirable is a far broader social, political and 
philosophical debate. 
It has now been established that financial constraints are responsible for artificial shortages in 
health care. That transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor will merely redistribute and not 
create health and that social upliftment and primary health care should take preference over 
curative services. It would appear that there are two major issues that will have to be addressed. 
One financial in nature and the other social, a shift from hospital based to primary health care 
system. 
Monetary resources may either be generated internally by taxation or sourced externally from 
foreign donors 10.11. A recession and a small tax base, restrict internal fund generation. Externally 
foreign aid to developing countries has been decreasing since the mid-1980s. The waning 
superpower rivalry and the increased need for help in Eastern Europe following the collapse of 
communism has made Africa less significant in the eyes of Western aid agencies. Amongst other 
things public funds are unnecessarily drained by corruption, the almost unsustainable foreign 
debt burden and a large and inefficient public service. Less money is available and the weak 
currency has further diminished the governments buying power of imported material. 
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According to the salutogenic model merely redistributing the wealth from the rich to the poor will 
not resolve the problem 16.17.18. Additionally due to the vast number of poor people very little could 
be redistributed for health to each individual. The recession has also decreased the number of 
wealthy individuals. 
The government has to be innovative in financial procurement for health 11.19-22. A leaner, more 
efficient public service would diminish costs of the public service. Broadening the tax base and 
innovative financing, for example a lottery to supplement health costs, would augment the 
government coffers. The World Bank and donor countries are advocating community financing for 
primary health care, where users are charged a small fee for service. The arguments are that 
user payment gives a perceived value to services, deters frivolous demand and decreases the 
opportunity for hidden unofficial charges levied by unscrupulous health workers. Payment would 
also contribute towards the delivery of health care and overall payment of a small fee may 
improve health services23. Interestingly South Africa has bucked the international trend, with a 
change in the opposite direction, that is from user charges to free primary health care services. 
Increased accountability and limiting corruption could do much for the morale of the country24. 
Wealth creation is important as it would broaden the tax base and as individuals become 
wealthier they would be able to afford to pay for their own health care. This has the double 
advantage of increasing revenue and decreasing government costs. According to the salutogenic 
model of health and disease there would be the additional advantage of increased health 16. 
Providing primary health care for all with no increase in spending involves redistribution of the 
health budget. As the previous budget was primarily hospital based, this means creating a new 
balance between hospital based and primary care services2.3.25. A hospital-based system is 
curative in nature and depends to a large extent on the traditional health care workers, doctors 
and nurses. As hospital's goals largely focus on the development of specialised activities, they 
may become a 'fortress' to protect those working inside their walls from responding to the needs 
of the community. Primary health care concentrates on preventative strategies and decreases 
the role of the traditional deliverers of health care, specifically the medical· personnel and 
particularly speCialists. Because of the change in emphasis, development of a good primary 
health care system in South Africa necessarily means a direct challenge to the hegemony of the 
medical profession. Any Minister of Health not irritating the medical fraternity is not dOing her/his 
work! 
The government driven reform of health care is taking place predominantly in the public sector, 
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where the major focus is on developing community facilities accessible through the district based 
primary health care. The rural poor are the most disadvantaged at present and this should 
improve accessibility to them. The public health care system will emphasise the promotion of 
healthy lifestyles, the co-ordination of the health services and community participation in planning. 
Primary health care will be delivered free of charge. The government will work towards efficient 
administration and effective systems of referral to secondary and limited tertiary levels of care. 
There will be collaboration with other factors effecting health such as housing, electrification, 
clean water and sanitation. There will be an improvement of environmental health services. 
They will attempt to involve the populace in their own health promotion. One of the issues to 
address may be how to bring ethics back into society and health care in particular. 
The complexity of social transformation and speCifically of health precludes any simple plan. The 
change from hospital to primary based health care in the absence of financial resources to fund 
both simultaneously will lead to hardships in the short-term. The government of the day has a 
political and moral responsibility to inform the public of the trade-offs involved in withdrawing 
existing services in order to benefrt future generations. 
Distributive justice demands that there should be a shift towards primary health care in its 
broadest sense. It would appear from the foregoing that an argument has been leveled against 
hospital based medicine and by implication neonatal intensive care. Poverty and dep.rivation 
continue in the country. The socio-economically disadvantaged are more prone to bad health6. 
Low birth weight and preterm labour is unequivocally more prevalent amongst socially 
disadvantaged populations. In 1990 the infant mortality rate for whites was 7,4 per 1000 births, 
compared to 48,3 per thousand for blacks22. This is important, as the social costs of rationing 
neonatal care must also be considered. Withholding care from liveborn infants will increase the 
infant mortality rate. Neonatal intensive care rationing has the potential to increase the already 
disgraceful disparity in neonatal deaths between the have and the have nots5.25 . Improving 
access to neonatal intensive care is a move in the direction of trying to rectify some of the 
injustices of the past. Like Rawls we could utilise the concept of fair opportunity as a rule of 
redress to attain greater equality. 
When considering allocation of health resources the government may also have to consider 
factors other than distributive justice. Given the country's political past, it is not surprising that the 
new govemment has introduced a constitution with a bill of rights. Rights are based on the theory 
of liberal individualism and rights are claims that individuals or groups may make on others or on 
societi6• A positive right is a right of provision, while a negative right is a right of freedom. 
Unlike the principles some rights are absolute, however most are prima facie. Like the principles 
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all rights should be specified and prima facie rights may have to be balanced. Th'e, unjustified 
action against a right or its violation must be distinguished from justifiable overriding or 
infringement of a right. 
Rights can be defined in terms of claims that are justified by moral or legal principles and that 
allow individuals to make claims that ought to be respected or indeed demand respect by 
others26. The significance of rights is that the person with the rights is able to justify the 
infringement of another's autonomy, for the claim determines the duty or obligation owed to the 
claimant. 
There is a self-imposed obligation on behalf of the South African Government following the 
implementation of Act 200 of 1993, the Constitution of South Africa that includes a Bill of Rights 
(Chapter 30 of the Act)27. Paragraph 30 of the Bill of Rights entitles every child under the age of 
18 to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health services and social services. In June 1995, the South 
African Government ratified the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, the 
idea being to ensure that the rights of children were not violated28. 
The importance of specification of basic health services can now be understood. The assumption 
of the author is that these are those health services required for survival and adequate 
functioning, thus including specialised services like neonatal intensive care. The assumption is 
based on the premises that the government already supplies these services and there should be 
universal and equal access to care. If the service is available then to make access to neonatal 
care equal and universal the government has an obligation to expand the service. The alternative 
is to make the service available to nobody. 
From the perspective of macroallocation it is the opinion of the author that neonatal intensive care 
facilities should be improved. Not only can this opinion be supported by distributive justice but it 
is also conforms with the governments self-imposed obligations to children as formulated in the 
Bill of Rights. 
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Chapter 6 
Consent, who should decide? 
Fictional autonomy changes guard; parentalism replaces paternalism. 
The tension between sanctity-of-life and quality-of-life ideologies, created by life sustaining 
technology has been legally and ethically settled in favour of the patient's right to self-
determination, based on the principle of respect for patient autonomy 1. The principle of respect 
for autonomy can be justified by both deontologists and utilitarians. The deontological viewpoint 
is given by Kant who argues that respect for autonomy is based on the concept that all persons 
have unconditional worth, as they are sentient and .have the capacity to determine their own 
destiny. To violate an individual's autonomy is to treat them as a means, in accordance with 
another's goals. Treating persons as a means and not as ends is a fundamental violation of the 
Categorical Imperative. Mill representing the utilitarian approach argues that the greatest good 
for the greatest number will be achieved if individuals are allowed to develop according to their 
own personal convictions, as long as they do not interfere with the personal convictions of 
others1• 
The moral rule that one should always obtain consent for inte.rventions with patients is derived 
from the principle of respect for autonomy. The right to self-determination is not . lost in the 
absence of decision-making ·competence. It is considered appropriate for surrogates to make 
decisions about life-sustaining technology. There are different standards by which the surrogates 
may decide for incompetent patients. These include the strong autonomy based pure autonomy 
standard; the weaker autonomy based substituted judgment standard and the beneficence/non-
maleficence based best interest ~tandard 1. 
Potentially there are five parties that could act as decision-makers 1.2.3. 
1. The patient: According to the principle of respect for autonomy from which the moral rule of 
taking informed consent is derived consent should be obtained from the patient. Competence is 
a threshold element or precondition for giving informed consent. Competence judgments serve a 
gatekeeping role, distinguishing between those whose decisions should be solicited or accepted 
from persons whose decisions need not or should not be solicited or accepted. Competence for 
decision making requires the individual to have the capacity to understand the material 
information, to make a judgment in view of their values, to intend a certain outcome and freely 
communicate their decision to care givers. In the normal doctor-patient relationship competence 
is presumed and is seldom challenged in the absence of a conflict of values between doctor and 
patient. 
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There are rival standards of competence and it should be remembered that competence 
judgments and grading are normative. In cases of borderline competence this may lead to moral 
and legal conflict. The neonate's cognitive development is at the sensory-motor level, sensory 
stimuli precipitate motor responses without higher mentation. The newborn infant obviously does 
not fulfill any of the criteria for decision-making competence and is not intellectually or physically 
competent to make decisions or to give consent. 
2. The family: Conventionally the patient's closest family member is the first choice as surrogate. 
In the case of a neonate, the parents would usually be the primary decision-makers as they 
engaged in a series of actions that resulted in the birth of the child and are presumed to have the 
baby's best interests at heart. Possible conflicts of interest include desire for a perfect child, an 
inability or unwillingness to accept a mentally or neurologically impaired child. Fear of financial 
burdens, the impact of the impaired child on the stability of the marriage or concern about the 
impact of the child on other siblings or potential siblings may all influence parental decision 
making. Parents may also request management that is considered futile and may cause pain and 
suffering. Requests for futile treatment may be based on parents' religious convictions, fear of 
impact of the loss of a child on a marriage, the inability to let go or a state of denial. Cognisance 
must never be lost of the incredible psychological strain that the parents must be under when 
taking these difficult decisions. 
3. Health-care professionals: Historically in the neonatal intensive care unit paternalistic 
decisions have been made by health-care professionals. This may be the prevailing sentiment in 
mar,y South African state hospitals, where neonatologists seek refuge behind parental ignorance 
or perceived parental ignorance. 
The principle of respect for patient autonomy has appropriately displaced the doctor as the 
primary decision-maker in the normal doctor-patient relationship. The primary role of the doctor 
now is to ensure that informed consent occurs, so as to facilitate the patient's decision-making. 
In the absence of conflicting principles, respect for patient autonomy has elevated the patient to 
the role of primary decision-maker. 
In cases where the patient is incompetent, however, the doctor retains a fiduciary obligation 
towards the patient and has an obligation to act as the patient's advocate. This will be discussed 
below under obligations of the health profeSSionals towards the baby. 
4. Institutional ethics committees: In facilities caring for the chronically infirm or aged, where 
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family members are not available, institutional ethics committees may be called upon as the 
primary surrogate decision-maker. Unless the preterm neonate has been abandoned, this 
situation seldom occurs in the neonatal intensive care scenario. In the case of neonatal care 
institutional ethics committees like the judiciary, may act as independent source of review. 
Somewhat removed from the doctor-patient relationship and the emotional atmosphere in the 
intensive care unit they generate open discussion and debate about issues and may help resolve 
disagreements between health professionals and parents. 
5. The judiciary: On occasions it is necessary to resort to the courts for decision making. This is 
an expensive route to follow and there is no proof that decisions made are any more satisfactory 
than the other potential decision-makers. An advantage of the courts is that although the correct 
decision may not be made procedural justice will be followed. 
Legal concerns 
Traditionally parents are recognised as the natural surrogate decision-makers for children. This 
presumption is premised by the notion that the child is not competent to make such complex and 
far reaching decisions4• In South African Law there is an irrefutable presumption that a child 
under six years of age is incapable of making legally binding decisions5. The choice of parents 
as the primary decision-makers is based on the facts that they bear responsibility for the children 
and that they are likely to bear the best interests of the child to heart. 
Historically this was a right based on the right of ownership; children were seen as the property of 
their father. In contrast to the previous proprietary situation, the relationship between the parent 
and child is now seen as a fiduciary relationship. Parents no longer enjoy the absolute right to 
make decisions. In South Africa the Minister of Health or one of the Minister's surrogates may 
intervene5. The right has almost evolved into a duty. Parents have a duty to maintain, protect 
and educate their children and from this they have a duty to provide care. 
The power of the state has also been transformed from seeing the child as property of the state, 
towards acting in the best interests of the child. The State will always attempt to follow the 
principle of perceived best interest. 
Ethical concerns 
It has been established that the neonate does not have competence for decision making. In the 
situation of ~ecision-making for incompetent individuals surrogates are expected to make 
decisions. There are different standards of surrogate decision-making 1.2. In the strongly 
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autonomy based pure autonomy standard, the explicit autonomous decision of a previously 
competent patient is respected. The surrogate merely conveys rather than substitutes the now 
incompetent patient's decisions. In the less strongly autonomy based substituted judgement 
standard, the surrogate decision-maker makes the decision that the surrogate believes the now 
incompetent individual would have made under similar circumstances were they competent. 
Obviously both standards require that the individual was previously competent and the standards 
differ in whether explicit instructions were left or not. Neonatal decision making incompetence 
differs substantially from decision-making incompetence of previously competent individuals. 
Here there is no life history to paint a picture of personal preferences and the infant has never 
spoken6. Another approach has to be taken. Because of an insufficiently developed central 
nervous system, the neonate has no values or beliefs that are necessary for an individual to have 
a perspective on their best interests. 
Neonatal incompetence .is a class of incompetence where individuals have never been 
competent. Competence and autonomy are not synonymous and the fact that the neonate is not 
competent to make decisions does not necessarily mean that the neonate is not autonomous. 
Gillon describes three types of autonoml. Autonomy of thought refers to intellectual activity and 
thinking for oneself. Autonomy of will is the freedom to decide to do things on the basis of one's 
deliberation; autonomy of thought is a necessary prerequisite for autonomy of will. Autonomy of 
action is the freedom to act on the basis of one's deliberation and will. Autonomy of action is 
dependent on autonomy of thought and autonomy of will. The neonate's cognitive development is 
at a pre-intellectual sensory-motor phase and the neonate does not have a deliberative process. 
It would appear, utilising Gillon's approach, that the neonate is at best a potentially autonomous 
individual. 
The neonate is not only incompetent to make decisions but has never previously been 
competent, so decision making cannot be extrapolated from the previously competent individual. 
The neonate is also not autonomous in the true sense of the word. Like the fetus obligations to 
the neonate have to be understood exclusively in terms of the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficences.9• They generate the moral status of the neonate and the obligations it is owed. 
The parents have a beneficence and non-maleficence based obligation to the neonate, as they 
are its moral fiduciaries. They are expected to promote the neonate's best interests and that of 
th.e child it will become. Health care workers also have beneficence and non-maleficence based 
obligations towards the neonate. 
The standard of surrogate decision making usually utilised in the never previously competent is 
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the best interest standard10,11,12. Concerning neonatal care the tenn 'best interests' appears to 
be ambiguous to some and criticism has been leveled against it, To have best interests a baby 
must have interests 13. A newborn like all other individuals can have an interest not to be wronged 
in the sense that it should not be used as a means to somebody to satisfy someone else's ends, 
The child probably has interests in being fed, kept wann and possibly also to be loved and cared 
for. While the child is conscious in the medical sense the child has no memories of self-
consciousness and is probably not orientated towards the future 13, Given these limitations a 
newborn cannot be said to have an interest in it's own future existence, Brody considered the 
notion of the infant's best interests as sensible but unknowable beyond it's interests in nutrition 
and wannth 14, We cannot know what an individual's interests are let alone their best interests 
without knowing a considerable amount about the individual. We kneed to know their plans and 
desires, Such knowledge is only possible after the parents and others have guided the 
development of the child. 
Alternatively the tenn 'best' may be viewed as the obligation to maximize the net benefrt to the 
patient6 . The surrogate decision-maker weighs up the potential benefits and burdens of various 
treatments and alternatives to treatment, induding withholding or withdrawing treatment. Under 
these circumstances the decision process is unquestionably utilitarian in nature. If we interpret 
best interest standard as maximizing the net benefit to the patient, possibly a better tenn would 
be the utilitarian standard of surrogate decision-making. While the moral rule to have infonned 
consent is primarily derived from the principle of respect for autonomy, the utilitarian standard of 
surrogate decision making is driven by a combination of obligations of the principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence. 
There can be no autonomy-based interests for the neonate. The assumed interests indude food, 
wannth and not to be hanned. The parents and the health professionals both have beneficence 
and non-maleficence based obligations to the neonateS,g. The life of the newborn are intertwined 
with that of the family and it is unrealistic to suppose that parents can decide for the newborn 
without making a choice for the family. For them the baby does not live in isolation. In the doctor-
patient relationship, doctors should be primarily concerned with the interests of the patient. 
Societal and family interests should not be considered except for the effect that these have on the 
interests of the patient6 . Utilitarian standards of surrogate decision making are inescapably 
quality-of-life decisions and nonnative in nature. It should be stressed to surrogate decision-
makers that these quality-of-life decisions should not be made subject to the perceived social 
value of the individual to the surrogate, but on the perceived value of the life of the person that 
must live it. Due to the nonnative nature of the decisions to be made and the different 
perspectives from which decision making' is viewed, there is an inherent tension between the 
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parental and medical decision-makers. It should be remembered that neither the parents nor the 
health professionals are necessarily unanimous units and there is the potential for moral 
disagreement between the parents themselves or the different health care workers involved. 
Balancing the potential outcomes of the utilitarian standard of surrogate decision making is 
undoubtedly extremely difficult. 
For the sake of the thesis the parents and health care workers will be seen as separate, but 
individually unanimous units (parents as one unit and health care workers as the other), each unit 
having its own unanin:'0us values and unanimous decisions. Often the parents and medical 
personnel are in agreement as to what plan of management provides the greatest benefit of 
goods over harms. Should the balance go clear1y in one direction and all parties agree then there 
are seldom problems. However balancing benefits and burdens are value judgements and there 
may be conflicting views between the parents and doctors about what is in the best interest of the 
neonate. Ultimately best interest decisions may have less to do with what is in the child's best 
interests than the level of comfort that the decision-makers have with one another's decisions. 
Best interest decisions are seldom questioned unless there is a conflict between decision-
makers15. 
Conflicts about treatment decisions usually result from one or a combination of the following 
fa cto rs6. 16. Firstly there are differing perceptions of the facts. This is understandable considering 
the degree of prognostic uncertainty. Secondly there are differing emotions and the parents may 
need time to adjust to the concept of impending death or survival of an impaired infant. Finally 
differing normative values can playa major role. If either the parents or the doctors have strong 
ethical foundations in vitalism, this will play a major role in decision making in the presence of 
possible death. Value decisions become far more varied when morbidity data enter the equation. 
The perception and values attached to individual morbidity is inherently subjective and will vary 
between individuals, families and cultures. Conflicts usually revolve around parents refusing 
what doctors consider to be reasonable care or parents demanding maximal care in the presence 
of what the doctors consider to be a futile outcome. Both of these problems are discussed in 
more detail in the chapter on utility and futility. 
Most conflicts can be resolved at the bedside using shared decision making where values and 
motivations for decisions made are openly discussed. It is essential for the doctor to be aware 
and sensitive to the possible reasons for the conflicts. The medical profession should also take 
cognisance of the inherent uncertainty of the prognosis and the normative nature of all 
judgements. It may be necessary for an ethics conSUltation if available, or the assistance of an 
institutional ethics committee. Both may be viewed from the parent's perspective as coercive in 
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nature, especially if they are in conflict with the parent's decision. Occasionally resolution can 
only be found in the courts. 
The moral rule requiring consent for medical intervention or non-intervention is derived from the 
principle of respect for autonomy 1. If the neonate is not an autonomous individual does this mean 
that consent is unnecessary? Some may reject Gillon's definition of autonomy and argue that the 
patient is indeed autonomous. Some may argue that the principle of respect for autonomy should 
include pre-autonomous individuals. If individuals that where previously autonomous are entitled 
to the respect of autonomy based on their previous autonomy, why not extend this respect for 
autonomy to individuals that subsequently will be autonomous? If respect for autonomy can be 
extrapolated back in time, why not forward in time also? This temporal extrapolation of respect 
for autonomy should not be confused with standards of consent. 
If we postulate that the neonate is not autonomous is there still an obligation to have informed 
consent? Legally the answer must be yes4,5. Morally if the neonate is not autonomous then the 
principle of respect for autonomy is fictitious. Beauchamp and Childress feel that the principle of 
respect for autonomy is not so broad that it can extend to non-autonomous individuals 1• They do 
however feel that the principle can be used as a canopy to protect non-autonomous individuals. 
If the principle of respect for autonomy is rejected in neonatal deciSion making, moral obligations 
to the neonate are driven by the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence and tempered by 
the obligations of distributive justiceS,S. Parents and health workers adhering to these principles 
are morally obliged to make decisions for the neonate. In the decision making process both have 
authority and responsibility. Morally emphasis should be laid on responsible decision-making, 
while legally emphasis may be on the process of authorization by informed consent. 
If there is conflict between parents and caregivers, how should the conflict be resolved? 
Caregivers need to remember they are not the holders of the absolute truth 16,17. Independent 
assessment either by a neutral individual, an institutional ethics committee or the judiciary is 
necessary. Possibly the best interest standard for the parents should be substituted by the 
rational parent standard. A rational parent standard would require that the parents demonstrate 
the ability to prioritize options for their child within the context of their own value system2. The 
absence of a definable value system or the absence of consistent decision making would bring 
the parents' decision-making capacity into question. The problem is what is a reasonable 
decision and who should adjudicate the reasonableness of a decision, 
The law attempts to define reasonability in terms of what the majority of people would choose 
under similar circumstances 18. This may appear straightforward where there are concrete data 
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on mortality rates. Obviously these data run all the risks of extrapolating group outcomes onto an 
individual. Mortality data can also lead to conflict if either the parents or the doctors have strong 
ethical foundations in vitalism. Decisions on reasonableness become far more difficult when 
morbidity data enter the equation. The perception and values attached to individual morbidity is 
inherently subjective and will vary between individuals, families and cultures. 
Treatment and non-treatment decisions for never previously competent incompetent patients is 
difficult and all we can hope for is imperfect procedural justice 1• Here the procedure is just but we 
cannot guarantee the right outcome, as judged by some independent standard. Decisions 
themselves are normative, however the procedure must be transparent, fair and reliable. 
There are basically three counseling approaches. Firstly there is parental compliance, where the 
parents are coerced to follow the course that the health professional recommend and prescribe. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum there is an ethic of health professional abdication where the 
health professional stands aside and abides by whatever decision parents make. In contrast to 
these two extremes is an ethic of engagement 19.20. Engagement differs from a good discussion in 
that all parties in engagement are granted equal status and are assumed to have equal decision 
making capacity, although using different data sets. Health professionals principally utilize 
scientific data, while parents use their knowledge of the self. The ethic of engagement 
recognizes the moral agency of all involved and synthesizes the medical knowledge with the 
parent's autonomy and insight. Engagement is a movement away from universalism, an 
approach that takes a stance of distanced objectivity, a right or wrong that applies to everyone. 
Engagement suggests that the right thing to do is created in the narrative, created by the open 
dialogue. Decisions are particular and contextual to the case and are not generalisable to other 
cases. Engagement should not be seen as a turn from universalism to relativism, in which no 
ethical theories or principles bear any weight and each moral agent renders an acceptable 
opinion. Engagement is an effort to jOintly work out how a particular case contextually relates to 
ethical theories. 
In the engagement model the health professionals do not simply recommend what to do next, as 
they only have knowledge of objective scientific data and not off the unique and particular views of 
the family. The family is also not confronted by a myriad of options that they only minimally 
comprehend. Engagement is a holistic process of assessment and decision making, in which all 
the data, views and resources of all the moral agents are brought to bear. 
The principle of respect for dignity and personhood of the neonate requires a careful assessment 
of both actual and potential pain and suffering of the infant as well as the potential for pleasure and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
s~tisfaction. The assessment should be based on the worth and the goodness of life to the child 
and not on parental utilitarian considerations such as emotional and financial burdens. Well-being 
is not static and must frequently be revisited; continuously involving the parents in an on-going 
assessment of the infant's prognosis is essential. 
Cognisance must be taken of parental vulnerability21.22. Health professionals in neonatal units 
deal with these dilemmas regular1y. The parents are suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a 
totally unanticipated outcome to the pregnancy, the possible imminent death of a small baby or a 
survivor with sequelae. Parental reaction is often similar to the stages of grief - shock, denial, 
guilt, sadness and then some degree of adaptation. Health professionals, how~ver, should not 
underestimate parental abilities, moral agency and sense of responsibility. 
Procedural Ethics 
When confronted by ethical problems in neonatal care, it is probably advisable to follow certain 
procedures22-24 . 
1. Determine who the surrogate decision-makers are. Both parents and caregivers have moral 
obligations to the child and both should be involved in decision making. Surrogate decision-
makers must give fully informed consent according to the same rigorous requirements 
necessitated under the informed consent doctrine. In the normal consent taking process 
competence is usually presumed. Where surrogate decision-making is to be made, medical 
personnel must be certain of the legal and ethical acceptability as well as the decision-making 
competence of the surrogate. Beauchamp and Childress have suggested that surrogate 
decision-makers should have the following qualities 1. Firstly competence in the sense that they 
have the ability to make judgements. They should be emotionally stable, which may be difficult 
under the circumstances. They should have a commitment to the patient's interests and be free 
from conflicts of interest. They should understand the concept of neonatal best interest and be 
able to distinguish the concept from their own best interests. The decision-maker should have 
adequate knowledge and information and this should be based on informed consent. 
2. Establish rigorous informed consent. There should be full disclosure and the doctor should 
explain the benefits and risks of all treatments under consideration as well as all reasonable 
alternatives, including the option of no treatment. The doctor should volunteer and motivate her 
recommendations. The decision-maker must demonstrate comprehension of the various choices 
that have been disclosed and the implications of the various options. The deCision-maker should 
be free from external influences to choose one option over another. Authorization or declining of 
treatment should be explicit and clear. 
3. Consideration of deCision, resolution of conflicts if necessary. 
4. Authorization of intervention or none intervention. The final step of informed consent is 
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authorization. Legally authorization is necessary and legally the parents have a presumption 
towards being allowed to give the authorization .. 
5. Transparency. The whole process should be transparent and open to review. 
Summary 
This chapter examines on what grounds and by who should decision-making occur for the 
neonate. Although there are numerous ethical approaches, principlism has been chosen, due to 
its widespread use in medical ethics and easy understanding by the medical profession. It is 
·easily understood by the medical profession due the vertical nature of it's reasoning, which is 
similar to the vertical deductive nature of diagnostic and therapeuti·c reasoning . 
. 
The argument has been made that the traditional four principles cannot be utilised, as the 
neonate is at best pre-autonomous. Moral obligations towards the neonate are dependent on the 
beneficence and non-maleficence obligations of the parents and the caregivers. Both these 
prinCiples are prima facie and may have to be tempered by distributive justice. The role of 
distributive justice was argued in the chapter addressing the issue. 
Informed consent is a legal if not a moral obligation. A definite moral obligation however is 
surrogate decision-making on behalf of the neonate. Parents and health-professions have 
obligations, responsibilities and authority. Neonatal best interests are difficult to define and may 
reflect negotiation between the decision-makers. Tensions between the parental and health-
professionals interpretations of utility and values, serve to protect the neonate. 
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Chapter 7 
Uncertainty and how decisions should be made 
Plato's absolutist thinking and Descartes mathematician's perspective has influenced medicine's 
romance with certainty 1. Traditional medical education fosters doctors with the notion that 
uncertainty is a manifestation of ignorance, weakness or failure. To avoid these stigmata students 
study hard to acquire knowledge and technological skills, thus providing themselves with what they 
perceive to be a reassuring cloak of certainty. 
Uncertainties in medical practice tend to be obscured or ignored. Patients tend to be 
unnecessarily overinvestigated in the doctor's desire to reduce. diagnostic uncertainty to a 
minimum. Patient's personal, social and psych<?logical concerns that all intensify uncertainty, tend 
to be downplayed. 
There is an urge to resolve uncertainty through selection and simplification. Selective focus is 
placed on those aspects of disease most amenable to investigation or intervention, allowing 
doctors to ignore and avoid the more uncertain aspects of medical problems. Unfortunately these 
untidy areas of uncertainty, selectively ignored by the medical profession, often encompass the 
patients' main concerns. Simplification is best exemplified by the extrapolation of outcomes from 
research, directly to individual patients. Protocols and guidelines are other manifestations of 
simplification. Repeated denial of uncertainty leads to forms of dogmatic authoritarianism. A 
prime example of dogmatic authoritarianism being the formulation of the guideline denying infants 
of less than 1000g admission to a neonatal intensive care unit. Proceduralism follows for all those 
that then follow this guideline. They have a procedure to follow that tells them what to do and 
absolves them of any moral responsibility. 
Those making the final decision are faced with uncertainty 1• This uncertainty entails: 
1. Technological uncertainty: Technological innovations devised to improve patient outcome and 
reduce clinical uncertainty, have only contributed to its increase. 
2. Quantitative uncertainty: The uncertainties inherent in medical practice are the result of clinical 
variability and an enormous range of int~rchanges between a host of factors. 
3. Qualitative uncertainty: Despite the shortcomings medicine has been . able to give an 
approximation of the quantitative risk that these infants have. A qualitative risk is exponentially 
more difficuH. One must remember that unlike others that may have been normal and then 
disabled, these infants are disabled from birth. 
4. Moral uncertainty: Who should decide? what are the infants best interests?, what should be . 
considered harm and how should resources be distributed? Uncertainty generated by the fact that 
there are few right or wrong answers. 
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5. Legal uncertainty ie passive euthanasia. 
6. Holistic uncertainty: It is important that the doctor should take cognisance of factors beyond the 
direct medical problem. The should include personal, social and psychological concerns of the 
patient and the patient's family. Addressing these issues tends to increase rather than diminish 
uncertainty. 
The accelerating pace of change within society has intensified all of the above. 
Resolution of uncertainty 
Karl Popper proposed the idea of propensities in which the world is not seen as a predictable' 
causal machine, but as an environment continually offering new possibilities with many factors 
affecting outcomes2• In the medical context, outcomes can be influenced by many factors, ranging 
from the individual patient's response to treatment to external influences within the environment 
and society, as well as advances in medical knowledge, skills and technology. 
There are three approaches that can be utilised to address uncertainty in clinical practiceJ.7. 
Limiting care based on probability of survival - the statistical prognostic approach. This 
approach seeks to define, by gestational age, birth weight or other criteria, a group of infants for 
whom the outcome is considered futile. For those whose outcome is considered futile, they are 
denied admission to neonatal intensive care. This strategy seeks to minimise the number of infants 
that die slow deaths or who live with profound handicaps and is willing to sacrifice some potentially 
intact survivors. This approach does not consider the death of an individual baby that may have 
been saved as the worst error. A characteristic of this strategy is that it accepts the probability 
that it will fail to save some infants that would be individually, socially and economically worthy, in 
order to avoid saving those lives that would be accompanied by great cost, both short term in the 
neonatal intensive care and long term in rehabilitation and remedial education. This conservative 
approach minimises the number of infants that survive neonatal intensive care with profound 
impairment, but denies a chance of life for other infants that may have been able to survive with 
little or no impairment. Fewer infants should also die in the neonatal intensive care unit as those 
infants most likely to die are denied access to the facility. This approach tends to flatter a neonatal 
intensive care's morbidity and mortality statistics. 
What should the fate be of those infants denied admission to neonatal intensive care? In essence 
there are two options; active or passive euthanasias.9. The first option, acting deliberately to cause 
direct and deliberate death is based on the assumption that one of the primary roles of the doctor 
is to avoid pain and suffering. Active killing of defective or even normal newborn infants is not a 
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new phenomenon. In antiquity, killing defective new-borns was normal practice, and in Sparta it 
was a legal obligation. Aristotle claimed that defective new-borns had no right to live. Plato said 
that even normal children of socially undesirable parents should be killed. In Rome defective new-
. borns were killed, as were normal children so as to reduce family size. In ancient Arabic societies 
it was an obligation to kill defective new-borns. All major religions and most contemporary modern 
societies strongly oppose the active killing of any neonates. 
Neonates denied admission to neonatal intensive care should be given comfort care 10, 11. Comfort 
care is basic supportive care such as warmth, oxygen and appropriate hydration and feeding. All 
should be accorded human dignity and receive love and attention. If possible their parents should 
spend as much time as possible with them. In essence comfort care is passive euthanasia as 
there is the deliberate withholding of life sustaining treatment. 
The method is just in withholding or providing care for similar infants and is socially aware of 
resource allocation 12, 13, 14. Having a statistical threshold for initiating therapy undoubtedly makes 
these decisions psychologically easier for medical personnel. It is psychologically more difficult to 
begin and then terminate treatment than never to begin it. For those that accept the concept of a 
threshold value, they can take psychological and moral refuge behind it. They did the best that 
they could; they were not allowed to do any more. Decision-makers are relieved of the 
psychological burden of having to make difficult decisions. 
A positive aspect about the conservative approach is that it minimises the expenditure of 
resources on infants that are judged to have little or no chance of survival.. There is a tendency to 
utilise this approach in developing countries. The role of distributive justice under these 
circumstances has been discussed in detail under distributive justice. 
This approach is only as good as the statistics upon which it relies. At the extremes these 
statistics would appear to be relatively reliable, for more borderline cases the data are less 
compelling. The problems associated with the interpretation of data and the extrapolation from 
generalisations was argued in the chapter on prognosis. 
Another problem with the a priOri approach is that some infants survive despite the withholding of 
treatment and by the time that life-sustaining treatment is initiated they have sustained significant 
neurological insults that may have been avoided with immediate treatment10• Failing to attempt to 
save lives of neonates on the border of viability, means that there is no opportunity to refine and 
improve on neonatal technology to save small infants in the future. The whole history of neonatal 
intensive care has been one of gradual modifications that decrease the iatrogeniCity of technology 
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and allow smaller and smaller infants to survive without hal1dicapping sequelae .. 
The a priori approach also minimises the role of parents as the decision to decline admission of 
the neonate to intensive care is beyond their control. Exclusion of parental decision making is not 
inevitable. However, as in units that have a cut-off, parents could be informed of their babies' 
statistical chances of death or severe disability and they could participate in the decision making 
process. Time constraints however may preclude parental decision making if this approach is 
followed. 
The 'wait until certainty' approach: Here all liveborn babies are aggressively resuscitated and 
provided with necessary intensive care from the moment of birth. Intensive care measures are not 
withdrawn unless the infant improves sufficiently to take over the vital functions in question or dies. 
Barring iatrogenic complications this approach offers all infants the greatest opportunity of survival. 
This approach ensures that all errors are fn one direction - on the side of life. It resembles the 
criminal law approach, which holds that it is better to acquit ninety-nine guilty defendants than to 
convict one innocent person. This approach is often followed by the Americans, many of whom 
believe implicitly in the concept that everyone deserves a chance. Once resuscitation is initiated 
and the baby admitted to the intensive care unit, fear of litigation is often the reason that treatment 
is continued until imminent death. 
Erring on the side of life is in general an appropriate principle, even though in individual cases 
some may consider prolonging of a hopeless existence as a greater tragedy. The wait until 
certainty approach is a policy that works on the perceived worst outcome, death, and avoids it at 
all costs. This type of policy may be referred to as a maximum strategy. 
The maximum strategy has numerous advantages. As doctors will err only on the side of life, each 
neonate's right to life is respected to the greatest possible extent. Management policy is set in 
advance, psychologically doctors will never have to agonise over whether or not to initiate 
treatment, whether to stop treatment nor. wonder afterwards whether they gave up to soon, 
denying the chance to a baby that may have survived. Parents will also never have to live with the 
guilt that they had to participate in the decision that allowed their child to die; they did everything 
possible. Treatment will only be terminated if the child gets better or if death or certainty of death 
intervenes. The approach yields a comforting degree of certainty. The maximum strategy does 
have the advantage that care is given to all and thus ongOing improvements in the outcome of very 
small infants will continue. 
A maximum strategy is obviously the approach to follow in complete ignorance of potential 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
probabilities. The less that is known about" the baby's prognoSis, the more compelling the policy. 
However, in the presence of more information and when the chances of severe impairment 
increase, the maximum strategy will at some point clash with the substantive principle that parents 
can legitimately view the outcome worse than death. Parents while initially elated with the idea of 
doing everything to save the infant may become disillusioned as the reality of the outcome dawns 
on them. The maximum approach disenfranchises them. The maximum strategy will inevitably 
maximise the number of infants that have protracted deaths over days, weeks or months, as well 
as those that survive severely impaired. It seems appropriate when knowledge about an infant's 
outcome is absent, but increasingly inappropriate when the data suggest that the child's risk of 
profound handicap is extremely high. A drawback of this approach is that it ignores any 
reasonable medical basis for predicting that severe impairment is highly probable if not certain. 
Likewise the approach pays insufficient cognisance to any suffering that neonatal intensive care 
may cause. The neonate's existence in intensive care often consists of painful and invasive 
medical procedures and innumerable crises. As the chances of a successful outcome wain, it 
becomes more and more difficult to justify forcing the child to endure the care and for the parents 
to watch it. 
The approach denies the ethical complexity of the situation. Those· that follow it will be 
increasingly governed by technology instead of employing it like a tool. Likewise the role of the 
parents is reduced to that of onlooker since the decisions as long as there is uncertainty have 
been predetermined. 
Resources are not limitless and in the South African public situation where there is a shortage of 
neonatal intensive care beds, a bed occupied by an infant that eventually will not survive or if it 
does survive will be severely impaired, is a bed that an infant with a better chance of survival will 
not be able to OCCUpy14,15,16. 
Provisional intensive care for all - the individualised prognostic approach: For this 
approach all neonates will be aggressively resuscitated and the baby will be admitted to the 
intensive care unit, unless following counseling there has been a justified prior request by the 
parents not to resuscitate the infant and that life support should be withheld. This type of request 
by the parents would only be justified at the extremes of birth weight or gestational age where 
futility can be anticipated. For all infants resuscitated and admitted to neonatal intensive care 
continuation of support would be contingent on decisions made by further" assessment of the infant 
and after thorough deliberation with the parents. This individualised prognostic strategy is typical 
of the British approach. The reassessment can be time limited as with severe asphyxia, where the 
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decision to cease further resuscitation may be made 20 to 30 minutes after delivery if resuscitation 
has not been successful at that point in time. In the case of extremely preterm infants there may 
be no time limited and the infant's condition is regularly re-evaluated. 
Due to varying neonatal care and differing illness severity in neonates it was necessary to develop 
measures of disease severity so as to be able to compare care between different neonatal 
intensive care units. Numerous systems have been developed. These include the Paediatric risk 
of mortality (PRISM), Score for neonatal acute physiology (SNAP) and Clinical risk index for 
babies (CRIB) 17.20. Scoring systems that quantify risk have an important role to play in research, 
planning and clinical audit. They facilitate more reliable comparison of disease severity to 
outcome and allow monitoring of quality of care between units and in the same unit over time. 
They are substantially more accurate than Single parameters like birth weight or gestational age in 
predicting mortality. 
Like birth weight or gestational age, predicting outcome using these systems also makes use of 
the observation, induction, and predictive deduction methodology. The universalisation problem 
also persists as the individual's outcome is compared to a group of infants that had a similar 
response to neonatal intensive care. If the methodology used to obtain and extrapolate data is 
identical to that used in birth weight or gestational age, why should predictive scoring systems be 
more acceptable? Firstly these limitations are present in all situations where statistics are used. 
When choosing a new car, information about the reliability of the car is based on the reliability of , 
the manufacturer and past models. If one wishes to purchase a reliable car it is reasonable to use 
this information, however one must also be alert to the fact that the car purchased is different from 
all the other cars. Secondly it is ethically appropriate to make management decisions based on 
clinical judgement19• Research has shown that empirically derived scoring systems project 
probabilities more accurately and more consistently than clinical judgement. They incorporate the 
experience of numerous experts and bolster the judgement of less experienced neonatologists. 
Unlike birth weight and gestational age the scoring systems are not used as gatekeepers, but to 
assess the response of the neonate to intensive care and from this to predict outcome 17-20. There 
are two advantages. Firstly they are based on the individual infant's response to intensive care. 
The second advantage is that prognosis is based on multiple objective criteria as opposed to a 
single objective criterion like birth-weight or a single semi-objective criterion like gestational age. 
Scoring systems will tend to recalibrate over time. Predictions made of a group of patients a few 
years earlier may overestimate the risk of death or disability, owing to technologica,l advances. It 
is important to continuously validate scoring systems. 
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The individualised prognostic strategy avoids the extremes of treating all infants until the outcome 
is certain or withholding all treatment as the neonate falls into a group where the prognosis is 
perceived to be grim. Neither type of mistake - sacrificing a potentially intact infant or saving a 
severely impaired one is necessarily to be avoided at all costs. Doctors employing this strategy err 
in both directions, though they seek through clinical observation to minimise each type of mistake. 
They optimistically initiate treatment in borderline cases to give the babies a chance. However 
while there is an ethical reason to initiate treatment, there is no compelling reason not to withdraw 
treatment should the child's prognosis subsequently be found to be poor. Ethically there is no 
distinction between not initiating and withdrawing treatment9,13,21,22. 
The individualised prognostic strategy allows the parents to be actively involved in decision making 
as the decisions have not been predetermined. It allows a wide, perhaps too wide variation in 
treatment decisions. Sometimes treatment will yield an infant so devastatingly disabled that death 
may have seemed more preferable. Likewise decision-makers may withdraw treatment from a 
baby that possibly could have involved relatively intact .. Doctors and parents will agonise and may 
later regret or be tormented by their decisions. Their agonising however is only commensurate. 
with the tragic nature of their dilemmas. The alternative approaches that limit the agonisation may 
be inappropriate for exactly that reason. The individualised prognostic strategy allows confusion, 
uncertainty and errors. When medical uncertainty leads to moral uncertainty, it seems preferable, 
albeit harder, to confront these dual ambiguities rather than to bury them under either statistical 
criteria or moral certitude. 
The individualised prognostic strategy seems to be the best. It is consistent with contemporary 
clinical practice, sensitive to the parent's role and unconstrained either by an oversimplistic 
vitalism, excessive fear of legal liability, or an emotionally appealing but ethically untenable 
distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment. The strategy both recognises and 
reflects the complex nature of these dilemmas. The approach accepts the uncertainty of 
prognosis, that there is more than one possible outcome and many choices. 
Flaws include those inherent in the informed consent process, particularly in surrogate decision 
making. Parents can decide based on their own best interests and not the best interests of the 
child. Health care providers may fail to fully disclose all the risks, benefits or treatment alternatives 
including no treatment other than comfort care. They may impose their own biases during the 
disclosure process; potentially being more pessimistic for socially disadvantaged couples. 
The distinction between the individualised prognostic strategy and the wait until certainty strategy 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
is the degree of certainty that has to be sought. The degree of certainty that allows the parents to 
opt to terminate treatment or that requires the overriding of their wishes. 
While absolute prognostic certainty is elusive, the outcomes of infants at the extremes of the 
spectrum appear to be relatively stable. Despite new technologies and innovations that continue 
to push back the boundaries of viability, cases exist in which all the known evidence lead the 
decision-makers to conclude that aggressive intervention is futile. In cases of probable fl,.ltility it is 
morally legitimate to withhold or withdraw therapy23. In contrast to the cases of probable futility, 
cases also exist where prevailing knowledge and experience suggest an excellent outcome. It is 
that group of babies between the extremes where uncertainty prevails. 
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Chapter 8 
Advocate and gatekeeper or advocate or: gatekeeper? 
In contemporary medicine there is a constant tension between the traditional commitment to the 
patient on the one hand and the awareness that resources are finite on the other 1. This tension is 
an unfortunate reality of medicine. The tension, far from being relieved by modern technological 
medicine is in fact exacerbated by it. The demands of .patient advocacy confront the constraints of 
limited budgets. In response, to constrain the growth of medical expenditure, doctors are now 
asked to serve simultaneously as the patient's agent for maximum health and as society's agent 
of cost containment. There is increasing pressure on doctors to serve two masters, the patient 
and societl·3. For the patient the doctor is expected to act as advocate, and for society as 
gatekeeper. Can the doctor serve two masters simultaneously? 
Advocacy 
The etymological root of the word 'advocacy' can be traced to the 15th century and means 
'pleading for support'. The linguistic routes stem from Latin 'Ad' being 'to' and 'Vocare' 
meaning 'to call'. In the legal profession the role is clearly defined and determined with the 
advocate as one whose profession is to plead the cause of anyone in a court of law; a counselor 
or counsel. The United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing considers advocacy as promoting 
and safeguarding the well being and int~rests of the patient4• Others perceive the advocate's role 
as supporting and protecting the rights and interests of the patient5 . 
The fully competent autonomous individual should be able to protect their own interests and 
rights. The assumption that advocacy is required in health care implies that there is a reduction 
of patient autonomy and that the patient's interests or rights may not be protected. In the normal 
patient-doctor relationship, where the patient is competent the patient may be disadvantaged, if 
only by virtue of their condition5. The principle of beneficence asserts an obligation to help others 
further their important and legitimate interests. Rules derived from the principle include protecting 
and defending others, preventing harm occurring or removing conditions that will cause harm to 
others as well as helping persons with disabilities and protecting and defending the rights of 
others. From this we can see that advocacy is justified by the principle of beneficence. It has 
been established that the autonomy of the preterm neonate is diminished. Thus the principle of 
beneficence now obliges the doctor to act as an advocate for the neonate 
The core condition most frequently cited as demanding an advocacy action is patient 
vulnerability. If one accepts the premise that the vulnerable are entitled to advocacy, one has to 
decide; who is vulnerable? In health care there are many reasons why a patient may be 
considered vulnerable5• The mere presence of disease places the autonomous patient as being 
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vulnerable to the condition. The poor and those at the extremes of age are usually considered to 
be most vulnerable. Few would disagree that the small preterm neonate is especially vulnerable. 
If vulnerability is a prerequisite for advocacy then the small preterm neonate also qualifies 
according to that criterion . 
. Advocacy is justified by the principle of beneficence. The principle of beneficence requires 
positive action or intervention. It is impossible to extend beneficence to everyone and hence 
beneficence is an imperfect obligation. Specific beneficence is directed at specific parties such 
as children, friends and patients, while general beneficence is directed beyond these special 
relationships to embrace all persons. . Specific beneficence is based on special moral 
relationships, while general beneficence is usually derived from some form of moral reciprocity. 
Specific beneficence may be extended partially, to those with whom we have a special 
relationship. Health care professionals - a broad term that includes doctors, have an obligation of 
beneficence to their patients which is over and above the requirements of general beneficent duty 
owed to society in generaI2.3. When dealing with an individual patient, as is the case when 
considering a baby for neonatal care, specific beneficence should take preference over general 
beneficence. Under these conditions the doctor has an obligation of advocacy for the patient. 
In caring for an individual patient the doctor should do everything to benefit that particular patient 
without regard to cost to societl3. In caring for the individual patient, the doctor. must act solely 
as the patient's advocate against the apparent interests of society as a whole, if necessary. An 
analogy can be drawn with the role of a lawyer defending a client against a criminal charge. The 
attorney is obligated to use all ethical means to defend the client, regardless of the cost of 
prolonged legal proceedings or even the possibility that a guilty person may be acquitted through 
skillful advocacy. 
Society also benefits if all doctors follow this principle. All patients can be expected to be treated 
humanely, decently and fairly. In a just society 'the physician who withholds care that it is within 
his p,?wer to give because he judges it wasteful to provide to a particular person breaks faith with 
his patienr2• A just society must have· a group of professionals whose sole responsibility as 
health car~ practitioners is to their patients as individuals. The distinction must be made here 
between doing everything technically possible and doing what the doctor believes is best. Doing 
everything technically possible is a vitalist approach as opposed to doing what the doctor thinks is 
right. 
The last two decades have witnessed a wealth of nursing literature devoted to the subject of 
patient advocacy6. The nursing literature tends to view patient advocacy to be the unique role of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
the nursing profession. Some even contend that the need for patient advocacy is due to medical 
staff transgressions. The basis for the assumption of a unique role for the nurse as advocate is 
unclear as is any evidence to suggest that nurses are any more virtuous than doctors in this 
respect. On the contrary in the third world the nurse may be the least virtuous individuals in the 
health care team. There is also no evidence that patients want or indeed have requested the 
nursing profession to represent their views or protect their rights. The hierarchical structures and 
authoritarian-style management makes it extremely difficult for the nurse to have the autonomy 
and influence necessary for the patient advocate. It may be argued that due to their power and 
authority in the medical hierarchy the doctor may make a more effective advocate7 • 
Gatekeeping? 
The term gatekeeper is metaphOrical in natures. The implication being there is a gate and there 
is something worth having beyond the threshold of the gate. As there is something worth having 
beyond the gate's threshold there are a group of individuals that wish to pass through the gate. It 
is the responsibility of the gatekeeper to decide who qualifies to pass through the gate and gain 
the benefits. Gatekeeping by implication is concerned with distribution, in this case the 
distribution of goods. Distribution of goods by a virtuous gatekeeper would be fair .and according 
to standards derived from the principle of distributive justice. 
By inference gatekeeping must refer to microallocation decisions. The macroallocation decision 
has already been made; the benefits are available; however, the applicants exceed the 
vacancies. Extrapolation of the metaphor of gatekeeper to neonatal intensive care facilities in 
South African public health facilities is easy to follow. Neonatal intensive care beds are available; 
however they are in short supply and applicants exceed vacancies. Somebody has to decide 
who may and may not be admitted. Pressure is applied to neonatal intensive care medical staff 
to decide which patients should be admitted to the limited facilities and hence the staff are 
expected to act as gatekeepers. 
While a virtuous gatekeeper would distribute goods according to the principles of distributive 
justice any justification for the role of gate keeping would have to be derived from general 
beneficence, - beneficence directed beyond the individual patient to other, future and potential 
patients. The advocate-gatekeeper tension is not a tension between two-prima facie principles, 
beneficence and distributive justice, but between specific and general beneficence. It is the 
feeling of the author that when confronted by the individual patient that specific beneficence 
supercedes general beneficence. 
By interpreting specific beneficence to supersede general beneficence it becomes obvious that it 
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is not possible for the doctor to serve the dual masters of advocacy and gatekeeper1·3. The 
doctor's obligations are primarily to the individual patient. When practicing clinical medicine the 
. doctor cannot serve two masters. The master must be the individual patient. The doctor's duty to 
the individual patient is not an antiquated concept but one that preserves respect, confidence and 
the proper functioning of the medical profession. If the medical profession becomes more 
interested in societal concerns than the patient's own needs, the drive for finding reversible 
illness, a correct diagnosis, or new potentially expensive new technologies will lessen or 
disappear. 
The argument does not imply that in caring for individual· patients doctors should disregard the 
escalating costs of medical care9.10.11. To help resolve the conflict between the roles of social 
agent and patient advocate one resolution is to eliminate waste from the system. To use cost 
effective treatment. Doctors can help control costs by choosing the most economic ways to 
deliver optimum care for the patients. 
Resource allocation: 
Resources belong to society and therefore society expects a certain order in their allocation and 
utilization. It should be society and not the individual doctor that makes decisions to limit the 
availability of expensive but effective care 12. 13. 14. Society and not the health care personnel must 
make the decisions and create the guidelines limiting the availability of life-sustaining treatments. 
If society, through their politician's decide to ration health care then the politician must take 
responsibility for the decision. 
Society controlling the distribution of society's resources is not without it's problems. 
Societal decisions about the correct allocation of resources are highly subjective and open to 
bias. An example may be the distribution of health care to the elder1y. Cost-benefit analysis 
tends to discriminate against the elderly and may turn this age discrimination into health policy. A 
large part of increasing health costs is due to expenditure on health care for older people and the 
majority of most people's health care expenses occur in the last six months of their lives 15. 
Negative attitudes towards aging and the elder1y may influence our willingness to cover these 
costs. Society may discourage doctors to utilize effective expensive treatment in the health care 
of the elderly. 
Any intervention for the good of the community must still be weighed up against a possible loss of 
personal autonomy. It should be remembered that the most murderous and totalitarian regimes 
have often acted in the so-called interest of the greater public good. 
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Society as the owner of resources is an extremely broad concept. Who decides on behalf of 
society? 16 The decisions are almost always made by politicians. Even in a democracy it is 
doubtful whether the decisions made by the politicians necessarily reflect the wishes of the 
people. Politicians often make decisions based on politics, especially when it comes to the 
distribution of resources. They are more likely to tend to distribute resources to voters than non-
voters. Those most vulnerable to health rationing are the politically disenfranchised and this often 
includes the poor and those at the poles of the age spectrum. 
The concept 'the greatest good for the greatest number' assumes a utilitarian health policy. If 
such a policy were embraced a significant number of individuals would suffer. While the concept 
of 'the greatest good for the greatest number' seems theoretically appealing, in reality society 
continues to care for the severely handicapped, the chronically ill and recidivists, at considerable 
expense. Society does not view the greater good in purely utilitarian terms, but in a mixture of 
competing philosophies. While society demands the wise expenditure of its resources, it is aware 
of its responsibilities to all its members. 
Society owns the resources and should be responsible for their distribution 16. What is the role of 
the doctor in this process? Bas~d on general beneficence doctors have a duty towards the 
community and should assist in setting of policies as experts. More importantly however based 
on both general and specific beneficence the role of doctors is to lobby vigorously in the political 
arena for the resources needed for high-quality health care for the population at large and for 
individual patients. 
Doctors should also play a role in educating the public so that they understand that doing 
everything is not necessarily the best for a patient. Our problem may lie not in our failure to cure 
disease but in our success; the unbridled pursuit of health jeopardizes both our personal lives and 
other important social goals, such as assurance of adequate education and housing. Callahan 
has suggested that calls for restraint should not be made to the medical profession as to the 
public17• Most proposals to cut costs of medical care call for changes in supply, especially 
services supplied by doctors. Callahan argues that the greater challenge is to change the 
demand for medical care, by urging the public to be realistic about the role of medicine in 
improving quality of life. Callahan calls for more caring and less curing to help counter the image 
of herd hearted arbitrary limits on care. 
The analogy between a lawyer representing a defendant and a doctor representing a patient was 
made ear1ier. This is not an unreasonable approach as long as individual patients and doctors 
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understand that in the court analogy there is a jury and a judge, probably best represented by 
society and politicians respectively14. The judge (in this case politicians) has to make a decision 
after having heard the evidence and doctors and patients are ultimately bound by that decision. 
Politicians should be held responsible for their decisions made on behalf of society and if society 
is unhappy with their decision making they should be replaced. For this to happen clear policy 
has to be formulated and made available to society and politicians have to stand by their 
decisions made 18. 
Summary:. 
The patient-society, advocacy-gatekeeper tension is ~ reflection of the tension between specific 
and general beneficence. Decisions about who should be admitted to neonatal intensive care 
units are microallocation decisions, taken at the level of the individual patient. At this level 
specific beneficence obligations should outweigh general obligations of beneficence. The doctor 
should be the patient's advocate and not society's gatekeeper. 
Resources belong to society and society should adjudicate their distribution. Although doctors 
may advise society, the eventual decisions and responsibility for them should be taken by society 
or society's representatives. Due to problems with society's decision making process and the fact 
that the system can always be improved doctors have an advocates role to vigorously lobby for 
the resources needed for quality health care. 
References 
1. Fuchs VR. The 'rationing' of medical care. N Engl J Med 1984;311:1572-1573. 
2. Levinsky NG. The doctor's master. N Engl J Med 1984;311:1573-1575. 
3. Spring CL, Eidelman LA, Steinberg A. Is the physician's duty to the individual patient or 
society? Crit Care Med 1995;23:618-620. 
4. UKCC. Exercising Accountability. UKCC 1989. 
5: Willard C. The nurse's role as patient advocate: obligation or imposition? J'Adv Nurs 
1996;24:60-66. 
6. Mallik M. Advocacy in nursing - a review of the literature. J Adv Nlirs 1997;25:130-138. 
7. Berman S. Training pediatricians to become advocates. Pediatrics 1998;102:632-636. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
8. Peam JH. Gatekeeping and assisted reproductive technology. The ethical rights and 
responsibilities of doctors. MJA 1997;167:318-320. 
9. Ubel PA, De Kay ML, Baron J, Asch DA. Cost-effective analysis in setting of budget 
constraints: is it equitable? N Engl J Med 1996;334:1174-1177. 
10. Gamer p, Kale R, Dickson R, Dans J, Salinas R. BMJ 1998;318:531-535. 
11. Kleinert S. Rationing of health care - how should it be done? Lancet 1998;352:1244-1246. 
12. Hope T, Hicks N, Reynolds DJM, Crisp R, Griffiths S. Rationing and the health authority. 
BMJ 1998;318:1067-1069. 
13. Warnock M. Ethics, ideology and rationing in the NHS. J R Col Med 1998;32: 118-120. 
14. Klein R. Puzzling out priorities. Why we must acknowledge that rationing is a political 
process. BMJ 1998;317:959-960. 
15. Lewis PA, Charnay M. Which of two individuals do you treat when only their ages are 
different and you can't treat both? J Med Ethics 1989;15:28-32. 
16. Beauchamp TL, Childress JA. Principles of Biomedical Ethics - Fourth Edition. Oxford 
University Press, New York; 1994. 
17. Callahan D. What kind of life: the limits of medical progress. Simon and Schuster, New York, 
1990. 
18. Knaus WA. Rationing, justice and the American physician. JAMA 1986;255:1176-1177. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 9 
Synthesis 
77 
The underlying theme of the dissertation is resource allocation and the accompanying decision 
making. Medical resource allocation, specifically neonatal intensive care is addressed. 
Essentially resource allocation occurs at both the macro- and microallocation levels in neonatal 
intensive care. At the macroallocation level decisions are made as to the necessity for neonatal 
intensive care beds and if they are necessary, where they should be situated. Microallocation 
decisions are concerned with allocation of specific beds to specific patients. 
The consensus statement of the 1 Oth Prioriti~s in Perinatal Care Conference addresses both of 
these levels. Reading the consensus statement macroresource-allocators may decide to budget 
for neonatal beds based on the requirements of neonates weighing more than 1000g. For the 
individual patient 1000g has become the th~eshold weight for neonatal intensive care admission. 
Prior to addressing resource allocation it is necessary to address the appropriateness of the 
consensus statement. The consensus statement of the 10th Priorities in Perinatal Care 
Conference is explicit in advising the restriction of neonatal facilities to neonates weighing more 
than 1000g. The implication being that birthweight alone is an appropriate prognostic criterion and 
that 1000g is the appropriate threshold weight. The chapter on prognosis has shown that 
birthweight alone is an inappropriate criteria and a threshold of birthweight of 1000g is extremely 
inappropriate, as many babies considerably lighter can survive without neurological sequelae. 
As regards macroallocation it was noted that there is no shortage of medical resources and if 
there is a resource scarcity, money is the scarce resource. Socio-economic factors have more to 
do with population health than health care and improving the health of the nation is probably more 
dependent on wealth generation rather than wealth redistribution. Government has an important 
role to play in stimulating wealth generation as well as procuring funding for health care. 
The present public health system is inequitable and does not provide for the needs of the 
population. Buchanan's nine elements for a fair and just health care system are advocated. 
Despite the new emphasis on primary health care, neonatal intensive care can _be justified by a 
number of factors. Cost-utility analysis shows neonatal intensive care to be extremely cost 
effective. The Bill of Rights advocates basic health care for children, the understanding of the 
author being that basic health care being that required for adequate functioning and survival. 
Finally if we believe in equity of health care and neonatal care facilities are available for some, 
they should either be available to all that need them or to none at all. 
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At present admission to neonatal intensive care, using the statistical prognostic approach is 
based on the probability of survival, albeit the threshold weight being inappropriate. 
Microallocation is relatively simple; if a bed is available and if the weight of the neonate exceeds 
1000g then the neonate may be admitted. Obviously if there isno bed available the baby cannot 
be admitted. Altematively if the baby weighs less than 1000g then admission is denied. 
Resource allocation is governed by a rule derived from the consensus statement. If we accept 
the rule then resource allocation and decision making is easy to understand simple, objective and 
dependent on birthweight. Psychologically those involved in microallocation decisions may take 
refuge behind the rules. 
It has been argued that in the presence of prognostic uncertainty the individual prognostic 
approach allowing provisional intensive care admission for all neonates, would be more 
appropriate. If all neonates are initially admitted then decision making becomes more complex. 
Issues such as who should decide and on what grounds should decisions are made become 
important. Neonates cannot decide for themselves and obligations to the neonate are dependent 
on the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. Both the parents and the health care 
workers have these obligations to the neonate. Although difficult to determine, decisions should 
be made in the perceived best interests of the neonate. 
Finally doctors have an obligation of advocacy to their patients that exceeds general beneficence 
to society as a whole. Doctors and interest groups should act as patient advocates and not 
society's gatekeeper. 
As can be seen it is the opinion of the author that the consensus statement is questionable. Both 
the use of birthweight to determine prognosis and the 1000g threshold if birthweight is used, are 
inappropriate. Additionally the profession's and particularly the individual doctor's obligation of 
specific beneficence to the patient should exceed the obligation of general beneficence to society. 
The consensus statements should be used in advocacy rather than gate keeping roles. 
One can only speculate why a group of individuals dedicated to the wellbeing of pregnant patients 
and their progeny issued the consensus statement. They are confronted daily with the reality of 
demand for neonatal intensive care beds exceeding availability. Utilizing birthweight as the 
decisive criteria was probably an attempt to introduce a Single, Simple objective criteria that can 
be easily evaluated, and allow equitable access of neonates to units. The choice of the threshold 
weight must have been selected more on historical than scientific grounds. 
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Appendix A: 
Tables showing survival for different gestational ages and birthweights. 
Table 1 
Year 23 weeks 24 weeks 25 week 26 weeks Reference 
1986-1990 12132 (37%) 28nS(37%) 54/90 (60%) 721113 (64%) Ferrara 
1988-1990 6/14 (43%) 9/19 (47%) 18/23 (78%) Grey 
1988-1991 6/40 (15%) 19/34 (56%) 31/39 (79%) Allen 
1988-1991 2128 ( 7%) 13/40(32%) 11/44 (25%) 35/62 (56%) Holtrop 
1989-1991 0/21 ( 0%) 5/11 (46%) 14/22 (64%) 18/35 (72%) Katz 
1990-1991 3/15 (20%) 8/18 (44%) 14/22 (64%) 27/40 (68%) Hagan 
1985-1992 1/ 9 (12%) 13/28 (45%) 26/551470/01 43/80 -<54%) Rennie 
1991-1993 1137 ( 3%) 27/97 (28%) 38/104 (36%) 73/132 (55%) Bohim 
1987-1994 11/33 (33%) 31/65 (48%) 35n4 (47%) 57/84(68%) Monison 
1990-1994 18/37 (49%) 31/41 (76%) 45/54 (83%) Kilpatnck 
Total 36/215 (17%) 144/368 j39%) 223/450 (50%) 325/536 (61 %) 
95%CI 12%-22% 33%-45% 44%-56% 55%-67% 
Table 1 shows the probability of survival at different gestational ages. As can be seen at a 
gestational age of 25 weeks 50 % of neonates can be expected to survive. 
Table 2 
Year 23 weeks 24 weeks 25 weeks 26 weeks Reference 
1983 0/1 ( O%) 2/6 (33%) 2/17 (17%) Wariyer 
1982-1986 2/5 (40%) 1/2(50%) 218 (25%) Weissman 
1884-1986 6/9 (66%) 12/31 (39%) Johnson 
1984-1987 2/7 (29%) 2/1 (11%) Eg-Anderson 
1985-1987 2/3 (60%) 0/7 (O%) 2/6 (33%) Ruys 
1983-1989 6/9 .( 66%) 16/43 (37%1 25/77 . (32%) Synnes 
1985-1992 212 (100%) 3/13 (23%) 8/27 (30%) 10/43 (23%) Rennie 
1986-1990 7/12 ( 58%) 8/28 (29%) 16/54 (30%) 27/32 (32%) Ferrara 
1980-1993 3/8 (38%) 12146 (26%) 16n3 (22%) Cooke 
Total 15/23(65%) 341101 {34%1 721235131 %1 69/263 (26%) 
95%CI 34%-96% 23%-45% 24%-38% 20%-32% 
.. Table 2 shows the probability of major sequelae In SUrviVOrs. At a gestational age of 24 weeks 
the majomy of survivors are unimpaired. 
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Table 3 
Year <5009 500-5999 600-6999 700-7999 800-8999 
1983- 18/382 
1994 
1991- 9/56' 27172* 40/83' 781108' 
1992 
1991- 1061321 1761346 2431374 330/407 
1992 
1994- 1031322 250/410 2961394 
1995 
Total 18/382 218/966 4531828 579/851 4081515 
15%) (31%) (68%) (68%) (79%) 
* Survival at 2 years (others are survival to discharge from hospital) 
VICSG = Victoria Infant Collaborative Study Group 
900-9999 Reference 
Sauve 
93/143' VICSG 
355/403 Fanarof 
Tyson 
4481546 
(82%) 
Table 3 shows the probability of survival at different birthweights. Sixty eight percent of babies 
weighing more than 600g can be expected to survive. 
Table 4 
Year 500-7499 750-9999 References 
1987-1988 43/127 21/39 (54%*) van Steenkiste 
1989-1991 58/177 148/227 Meadow 
1985-1994 77/173 169/266 Morrison 
1991-1992 382/869 793/982 Fanaroff 
Total 490/869 (36%) 1131/1514 (75%) 
This unit subsequently reported a 76% survival for these neonates. 
Table 4 shows the probabilities of survival in two groups of birthweight. 
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